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 OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 
                
  
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 These consolidated appeals have been taken from 
judgments and orders in three civil actions against the City of 
Philadelphia and certain of its former officials and employees.  
The plaintiffs' claims arose out of an attempt by the 
Philadelphia Police Department on May 13, 1985, to execute search 
warrants and arrest warrants at a premises in Philadelphia 
occupied by a group known as MOVE.  After hours of gunfire and 
failed attempts to inject tear gas into the residence in which 
the MOVE members had barricaded themselves, police officers 
dropped an explosive device on the roof of the house.  The 
ensuing fire killed 11 persons, including five children, in the 
residence and destroyed dozens of homes in the vicinity. 
 The plaintiffs appeal from the district court's grant 
of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds in favor of 
certain of the defendants with respect to claims arising from the 
dropping of the explosive device.  Philadelphia Managing Director 
Leo A. Brooks, Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor, and Fire 
Commissioner William C. Richmond appeal from the district court's 
denial of their motions for summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds with respect to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
arising from their alleged decisions to let the fire burn.1  They 
                     
1
.  For simplicity and convenience, we will address these 
officials by the titles they held during the 1985 conflict even 
though they may no longer hold such titles.  The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania and certain of its officials and employees also have  
been parties to this litigation but they are not involved in 
these appeals. 
  
also appeal from the denial of their motions for summary judgment 
on state claims asserted against them.  The city itself appeals 
from the denial of its motion for summary judgment.   
 The court is divided on the disposition of various 
issues and on certain issues there are majorities consisting of 
each of the three possible combination of judges.  On other 
issues the court is unanimous.  In this opinion I will set forth 
the ultimate conclusions reached and also will set forth the 
majority view on some points and my own view on other points.  
Judges Scirica and Lewis are filing separate opinions.  As a 
matter of convenience I largely will deliver this opinion in the 
first person.  
 Judge Scirica and I conclude that all the individual 
defendants are immune because their actions on May 13, 1985, did 
not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of 
plaintiff Ramona Africa and decedents Frank James and Vincent 
Lopez Leaphart.   Accordingly, we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment to defendants Wilson Goode, the mayor of the 
city, and police officers Frank Powell and William Klein, and 
will reverse the denial of summary judgment on the section 1983 
claims to defendants Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond.  Judges 
Scirica and Lewis conclude that the City of Philadelphia is not 
entitled to summary judgment on the section 1983 claims and 
accordingly we will affirm the district court's denial of summary 
judgment to the city on those claims.  Judge Lewis and I conclude 
that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeals from the 
district court's denial of summary judgment for Brooks, Sambor 
  
and Richmond on the state law claims based on letting the fire 
burn.  Accordingly, we dismiss those appeals. 
 There also is a related property claim before us filed 
by Louise James seeking compensation for the destruction of the 
MOVE house.  For the reasons we discuss below we all conclude 
that we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal from the 
dismissal of that claim.  Consequently, we will dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction James' appeal insofar as it relates to her 
property claim.  
 
 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
 Because the motions for summary judgment involved the 
individual defendants' claims of entitlement to qualified 
immunity, the district court indicated that its rulings were 
based on the "plaintiff's well-documented version of the facts," 
as called for by Good v. Dauphin County Social Serv., 891 F.2d 
1087, 1094-95 (3d Cir. 1989).  This court since has clarified 
that such a determination should be based on the undisputed facts 
as revealed by the record and on the plaintiff's version of the 
facts where there are disputes.  Melo v. Hafer, 13 F.3d 736, 745 
(3d Cir. 1994) ("If, after the summary judgment practice 
prescribed by that rule, the undisputed facts of record 
demonstrated entitlement to immunity, the Court would ignore the 
bare allegations of the complaint and grant summary judgment on 
grounds of immunity."); see also Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 
1097, 1110-11 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 
S.Ct. 2827 (1991).  In this case, the extensive record includes 
  
the discovery and investigative reports from a state grand jury 
and a special commission which studied the incident.  These 
materials are particularly significant because Ramona Africa, the 
only surviving witness from inside the premises who has testified 
for the plaintiffs as to the events that occurred on May 13, 
1985, has limited knowledge of the facts because she was in the 
cellar with the children for most of that day and did not hear 
any of the announcements made by either police officers or MOVE 
members.  See app. at 1362-65. 
 The material undisputed facts are as follows.  In 1978, 
pursuant to a court order, the city attempted to evict MOVE 
members from a residence in Powelton Village.  However, the MOVE 
members resisted and a gunfight broke out.  As a result, one 
police officer was killed and several other police officers and 
fire fighters were wounded.  Subsequently, nine MOVE members were 
convicted for the murder of this officer. 
 In the early 1980's MOVE members took up residence at 
6221 Osage Avenue, Philadelphia.  By any standard they were a 
disrupting neighborhood force.  Some used loudspeakers to 
communicate threats and dissatisfaction to their neighbors.  
Furthermore, the Probable Cause Affidavit (the Affidavit) 
supporting the issuance of the warrants executed on May 13, 1985, 
states that a MOVE member had threatened Mayor Goode, calling him 
"a nigger motherfucker" and indicating that "we have a bullet for 
[Mayor Goode] . . . to blow his motherfucking head off.  If we 
have to, we will go down to City Hall and put six in his head."  
App. at 2294.  The Affidavit also states that the same MOVE 
  
member announced, "[w]e will kill any motherfucking cop that 
comes to the front, back or our goddamned roof," and threatened 
two police officers that if they "come back around here again, 
we'll kill you; put a bullet in your head."  Id. 
 The Affidavit states further that several neighbors 
said that "they heard MOVE members say over the loudspeakers that 
they have wired the entire block with explosives and that if any 
neighborhood resident speaks with the press, or if the police 
take action against MOVE, MOVE will blow up the entire block."  
App. at 2295.  Neighborhood residents stated that they had seen a 
MOVE member on the roof with a weapon or a gun.  App. at 2296.  
The Affidavit also notes that one of the MOVE members at 6221 
Osage Avenue was on parole from a conviction for riot, 
terroristic threats, and possession of an instrument of crime.  
Id. 
 The Affidavit also states that in 1984, neighbors had 
observed MOVE members carrying sandbags into the Osage Avenue 
building.  App. at 2301.  The windows of the building had been 
blocked with wooden slats, and aerial photographs showed that a 
bunker had been constructed on its roof.  App. at 1568, 2301. 
 The arrest and search warrants were issued on May 11, 
1985, upon a judicial finding of probable cause.  App. at 2291.  
After District Attorney Edward Rendell informed Mayor Goode that 
there was probable cause, the Mayor instructed Police 
Commissioner Sambor to develop a plan to execute the warrants.  
Goode testified that earlier that week, he attempted to negotiate 
  
with certain MOVE members but they rebuffed him with a message, 
"Now we are ready.  Tell them to come on."  App. at 897-901. 
 A few days prior to the confrontation, the Civil 
Affairs Unit of the Police Department received a hand-written 
letter signed with Ramona Africa's name.2  App. at 1739-53.  The 
letter warned that any police raids on MOVE would fail, and 
threatened that "if [police officers] succeed in coming thru the 
walls they are going to find smoke, gas, fire, and bullets.  
Before we let you mutha fuckas make an example of us we will burn 
this mutha fuckin house down and burn you up with us."  App. at 
1234, 1751. 
 Police Commissioner Sambor developed the initial plan 
to execute the warrants, which was to evacuate the neighborhood, 
request a peaceful surrender, and, if necessary, use tear gas to 
force the MOVE members from the house.  App. at 1985-86.  Because 
of the bunker on the roof, it was decided that the police would 
make holes in the sides of the house and insert tear gas through 
them rather than through the roof.  App. at 1575-76, 1985.  To 
provide cover for the "insertion teams," i.e., the officers who 
were to enter the adjoining houses and create the holes, the plan 
provided for the fire department to aim water hoses at the bunker 
while the police fired smoke canisters around the house.  App. at 
1456-58, 1771, 1986.  Rather than having the officers drill holes 
into the walls of the house, thereby exposing them to assault 
                     
2
.  Ramona Africa denies having any knowledge of the letter, see 
app. at 1360, but she does not deny that the police received the 
letter prior to the day of confrontation. 
  
while they were drilling, the plan called for "shape charges," or 
small explosives, to be used to create the holes.  App. at 1416, 
1570, 1986-87.  Once they created the holes, it was expected that 
they would inject tear gas into the MOVE house and force out the 
occupants.  App. at 1419, 1570, 1987. 
 On May 12, 1985, the city evacuated the neighborhood 
residents.  App. at 2229.  Beginning at approximately 3:00 a.m. 
the next morning, police officers and fire fighters took up their 
places around 6221 Osage Avenue.  App. at 2230.  At around 5:30 
a.m., Police Commissioner Sambor announced over a bullhorn that 
the police had arrest warrants for four persons in the house and 
that they had 15 minutes to surrender.  App. at 1609, 1764-69, 
1856, 2036, 2230.  MOVE members responded over the loudspeaker 
that they would not surrender, and one yelled: 
 You're going to be laying in the street, 
bleeding in the street.  Come on in and get 
us.  We're going to kill you where you stay, 
where you lay.  We see you on the roof.  We 
know you're in those houses. 
 
App. at 1093, 1777, 1791-92, 2037, 2230.  After the 15 minutes 
lapsed, the police began to fire tear gas and smoke projectiles 
at the house while the fire department began to squirt water onto 
the roof of the house to provide cover for the insertion teams.  
App. at 1043-44, 1778-79, 2230, 2037-38. 
 A few minutes later, someone in the MOVE house fired 
shots at the police.  App. at 2038, 2230.  Muzzle flashes were 
seen from the bunker atop the roof.  App. at 1780-85, 1791, 1797-
98, 1826-29, 2038.  A massive gun battle followed for at least an 
  
hour and a half.  App. at 2041, 2230.  Meanwhile, the insertion 
teams had set off several explosions on both sides of the house.  
App. at 2043-45, 2048-49, 2230.  By mid-morning, the fronts of 
the MOVE house and adjoining houses were damaged heavily.  App. 
at 1616-17, 2230-31.  Yet, because they were under heavy gunfire 
and because the walls of the MOVE house were fortified, the teams 
could not create usable pathways through which tear gas could be 
introduced successfully.  App. at 959-61, 1878-91, 2043-50, 2230-
31.  Consequently, the original plan was abandoned and the 
officers on the insertion teams retreated.  As they did so they 
heard children's voices coming from the basement of the MOVE 
house.  App. at 2051.  Still, MOVE members had not given any 
indication that they would surrender.  App. at 2231. 
 Around 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Sambor, Brooks, 
Richmond, and other city officials and police officers, discussed 
alternative ways to remove the bunker and to proceed against the 
MOVE members.  App. at 971-75, 2060-61, 2231.  They also 
discussed whether to let the situation stand overnight and 
continue their efforts to execute the warrants the next morning.  
App. at 977-80, 998, 1004-05.  But they determined that they 
could not wait until morning because it would be too difficult to 
keep the neighborhood secure through the night due, among other 
factors, to the darkness and the exhaustion which likely would 
set in on the officers who had been on duty since the night 
before.  Id.  They also believed that MOVE members might escape 
through tunnels rumored to have been dug under the neighborhood.  
Id; app. at 1410-11, 1504, 1666-67. 
  
 Accordingly, the officials considered other means to 
execute the warrants but they rejected all as too dangerous.  
These included plans to use a crane to remove the bunker, to 
attack from above the roof, to attack from the front or the back 
of the house, and to place an explosive in the bunker.  App. at 
963, 2060-61.  The officials then focused on a plan to drop a 
"satchel charge" onto the bunker from a helicopter to destroy or 
dislodge the bunker and create a hole in the roof.  App. at 1131, 
2061-62.  The officials discussed the possibility that the 
explosive could start a fire but they were satisfied that the 
risk would be negligible.  App. at 981, 1011, 1149, 1191, 2061-
62.  Managing Director Brooks then informed Mayor Goode of the 
plan to use the explosive, and Mayor Goode approved it.3  App. at 
983-84, 1070, 2064-65, 2231.  At about the same time, a group of 
neighbors used a bullhorn to plead with the MOVE members to 
surrender but received no response.  App. at 966-68, 1852-54, 
2231. 
 The plan to use the explosive went forward.  App. at 
2231.  Klein constructed the device and Powell dropped it on the 
roof of the MOVE house from a helicopter operated by state 
troopers Richard Reed and Morris Demsko.  App. at 2068, 2231.  
Rather than destroying the bunker, however, the satchel seems to 
have missed it entirely.  App. at 1622-23, 2058. 
                     
3
.  There is a dispute as to whether Mayor Goode knew that the 
plan was to drop the explosive from a helicopter, but this is not 
germane to my discussion because he knew and approved of dropping 
the explosive onto the bunker. 
  
 Goode watched the explosion on television in his City 
Hall office, Brooks and Sambor observed it from the balcony of a 
nearby building, and Richmond saw it from Osage Avenue.  Id. at 
1156, 2097.  Brooks described his observations as follows: 
  I observed an explosion that was from 
our [vantage point,] a dust ball, in other 
words a smoke ball. . . .  It blew wood in 
all directions.  Then it was very -- then the 
smoke rose.  It was a very light gray smoke, 
as the smoke rose away from it, the 
helicopter was flying above it, and we could 
see nothing there but a hole in the roof. 
 
App. at 987. 
 Shortly after the explosion, observers saw a fire on 
the roof.  App. at 988.  There is evidence that a detonation 
caused the fire by igniting combustible liquid vapor.  App. at 
2058, 2311.  Commissioner Sambor, who now was on Osage Avenue 
with Commissioner Richmond, then asked Richmond, "if we let the 
roof burn to get the bunker could we then subsequent to that 
control the fire?"  App. at 1072-73.  Sambor testified: 
 I wanted to get the bunker.  I wanted to be 
able to somehow have tactical superiority 
without sacrificing any lives if it were at 
all possible.  And in that vein I asked him -
- I'm a police officer.  I am not a fire 
fighter.  I asked him for his concurrence, 
that if we let the roof burn to get the 
bunker, could we then control the fire.  And 
whatever the response was, it was in the 
affirmative. 
 
App. at 1073.  Richmond's testimony corroborates this: 
 I told him essentially that, that I thought 
we could contain the spread at that point.  
He said, 'Let's let the bunker burn to 
eliminate that high ground advantage and the 
tactical advantage of the bunker,' and I 
  
said, 'Okay' . . . .  He made the 
recommendation, . . . and I concurred. 
 
App. at 1163.  Richmond also testified that he had prepared the 
fire fighters as soon as he knew of the fire.  App. at 1157.  But 
because he did not know the positions of the police officers, if 
any, around the area of the roof he first told an aide, "[g]et a 
hold of the police and see what they want to do about this fire 
on the roof."  Id.  Thus, the fire was allowed to burn until 
Goode and Brooks ordered that it be extinguished. 
 The fire fighters, however, encountered many problems.  
For example, there was a live electrical wire in the vicinity, 
the water itself caused visibility problems, and the water caused 
the fire to "bank," or invert, downward into the house.  Id. at 
1158-59, 2117-20.  The fire then went out of control killing 11 
people and destroying 61 houses.  Ramona Africa and a young boy 
were the only survivors from the house. 
  
 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
  
 A. The Claims 
 Numerous suits were filed by property owners from the 
neighborhood and on behalf of the occupants of 6221 Osage Avenue.  
The court consolidated these cases for discovery under number 85-
2745, to be managed by a magistrate judge. 
 The defendants' answers raised affirmative defenses, 
including immunity from liability.  The individual defendants, 
sued also in their official capacity as officers or employees of 
  
the city (collectively, the city defendants), joined Ramona 
Africa as an additional defendant.  Africa then moved to dismiss 
this third-party complaint but the court denied her motion.  She 
then joined in this action against the city defendants and the 
City of Philadelphia, and her case was added to number 85-2745.  
During the ensuing four and a half years most of the claims were 
resolved.  The remaining claims are Ramona Africa v. The City of 
Philadelphia, et al., number 87-2678, Alfonso Leaphart v. The 
City of Philadelphia, et al., number 87-2756, and Louise James v. 
The City of Philadelphia, et al., number 85-3528. 
 Ramona Africa sued the City of Philadelphia and Mayor 
Wilson Goode, Managing Director Leo Brooks, Police Commissioner 
Gregore Sambor, Fire Commissioner William Richmond, District 
Attorney Edward Rendell, City Police Lieutenant Frank Powell, 
City Police Officers William Klein and Michael Tursi, City Police 
Sergeants Albert Revel and Edward Connor, State Police Corporal 
Morris Demsko, and State Trooper Richard Reed, in their official 
capacities and individually.  Africa claimed that:  (1) the 
defendants, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, deprived her of her 
constitutional rights of freedom of religion, expression, and 
association, of due process, of equal treatment under the law, 
and of "freedom from excessive force, assault and bodily injury," 
app. at 102; (2) the defendants, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1985(3), conspired to deprive her of these constitutional rights; 
and (3) the defendants violated state law in using unreasonable 
force in the arrest in violation of section 1983.  Africa seeks 
compensatory and punitive damages.  Her action against Rendell 
  
was, however, dismissed on qualified immunity grounds and she 
does not appeal from that dismissal. 
 Alfonso Leaphart sued on behalf of John Africa a/k/a 
Vincent Lopez Leaphart, who perished in the fire.  Leaphart 
initially sued the same defendants as Ramona Africa as well as 
certain others, but his suit was dismissed as to some of the 
defendants prior to entry of the orders now on appeal.  
Currently, the defendants in his case are the City of 
Philadelphia, Mayor Goode, Commissioner Richmond, Lieutenant 
Powell, and Officers Klein, Tursi, and Revel.  Leaphart alleges 
that they violated his decedent's rights under the First, Fourth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 
1985(3).4  He seeks compensatory and punitive damages as well as 
declaratory relief. 
 Louise James sued on behalf of her son Frank Africa 
a/k/a Frank James, who perished in the fire, and on her own 
behalf as owner of 6221 Osage Avenue.  James currently sues the 
City of Philadelphia, Mayor Goode, Commissioners Sambor and 
Richmond, Managing Director Brooks, and Lieutenant Powell, for 
compensatory and punitive damages.  In her personal capacity, she 
asserts a claim under the Fifth Amendment for the uncompensated 
destruction of her property.  On behalf of her son, she asserts a 
section 1983 claim and a section 1985(3) claim based on the 
                     
4
.  Leaphart also asserted a claim under the Fifth Amendment but 
I do not deal separately with that claim inasmuch as the Supreme 
Court indicated in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 
(1989), that excessive force claims should be considered under 
the Fourth Amendment.  I discuss this point later. 
  
alleged deprivation of her son's constitutional rights and state 
law claims.  As is evident, some of the claims asserted by all 
three plaintiffs against certain defendants are identical.  
Accordingly, I will treat such similar claims together. 
 
 B. The District Court Rulings 
 In a March 26, 1992 report and recommendation, the 
magistrate judge recommended that the court deny the motions for 
summary judgment sought on qualified immunity grounds by Mayor 
Goode, Managing Director Brooks, Commissioner Sambor, 
Commissioner Richmond, Lieutenant Powell, Officer Klein, and 
State Police Officers Demsko and Reed.  See Africa v. City of 
Philadelphia, 809 F. Supp. 375, 376-77 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(hereinafter Africa I).  He also recommended that the court grant 
summary judgment in all three cases on qualified immunity grounds 
to Officers Tursi, Revel, and Connor because they were involved 
only with the attempted penetration of the sides of the house.  
Id. at 377 n.5.  The district court approved and adopted the 
latter recommendations, and these orders have not been appealed.  
Id. 
 But the district court remanded the remaining matters 
to the magistrate judge for consideration under the guidelines 
the Supreme Court set forth in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
105 S.Ct. 1694 (1985), stating as follows: 
 [T]he court must determine, on plaintiff's 
well-documented version of the facts, whether 
a reasonable officer in each defendant's 
position, to the extent that this defendant 
could be found to have some responsibility 
  
for the use of force in question, could have 
believed that the force employed was 
necessary to protect the safety of himself or 
others. 
 
Africa I, 809 F. Supp. at 382 (citation omitted); In re City of 
Philadelphia Litig., 849 F. Supp. 331, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(hereinafter Africa II). 
 On October 6, 1993, the magistrate judge issued another 
report and recommendation.  He analyzed the defendants' actions 
as involving two separate decisions: the plan to drop the 
explosive device onto the bunker and the decision to let the fire 
burn.  He concluded as follows: 
 [A] reasonable person in each of the 
defendant's positions could have believed 
that the use of an explosive device to remove 
the bunker from the roof and to provide 
access to the interior of the house for tear 
gas was necessary to 'prevent death or 
serious bodily injury' to the police officers 
on the scene or other persons.  In addition, 
based on the information available to them 
regarding MOVE's threat of violence and 
MOVE's use of force in resisting arrest, they 
could have believed that the use of the bomb 
would be conduct that was consistent with the 
principles embodied in Section 5085 [of the 
Pennsylvania Crimes Code] and Garner. 
                     
5
.  The Supreme Court cited the Pennsylvania Crimes Code in 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17 n.18, 105 S.Ct. at 1704 n.18, 
in developing the Court's constitutional standard.  Section 508 
states, in relevant part: 
 
 (1)  A peace officer, or any person whom he 
has summoned or directed to assist him, need 
not retreat or desist from efforts to make a 
lawful arrest because of resistance or 
threatened resistance to the arrest.  He is 
justified in the use of any force which he 
believes to be necessary to effect the arrest 
and of any force which he believes to be 
necessary to defend himself or another from 
  
 
Africa II, 849 F. Supp. at 337, 357.  Section 508 defines the 
circumstances in which a police officer may use force in making 
an arrest.  Thus, the magistrate judge recommended that all 
defendants be granted summary judgment in all three cases to the 
extent that the plaintiffs sought to impose liability based on 
the dropping of the explosive device.   
 The magistrate judge concluded, however, that under the 
standards of Tennessee v. Garner and section 508 of the 
Pennsylvania Crimes Code it was unreasonable to let the fire burn 
after the bunker had been neutralized.  Id. at 337, 359-61.  He 
also determined that Commissioners Sambor and Richmond made the 
decision to let the fire burn but that the other city defendants 
were not involved at this stage.  Id. at 337, 360.  Therefore, he 
(..continued) 
bodily harm while making the arrest.  
However, he is justified in using deadly 
force only when he believes that such force 
is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or such other 
person, or when he believes both that: 
 
  (i) such force is necessary to 
prevent the arrest from being 
defeated by resistance or escape; 
and 
 
  (ii) the person to be arrested has 
committed or attempted a forcible 
felony or is attempting to escape 
and possesses a deadly weapon, or 
otherwise indicates that he will 
endanger human life or inflict 
serious bodily injury unless 
arrested without delay. 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 508(a) (1983). 
  
recommended that the court deny summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds for the two commissioners with respect to claims 
based on letting the fire burn.  Id.  They objected to this 
recommendation on the ground that the evidence demonstrated that 
they had intended to let the fire consume only the bunker, which 
they believed to pose a lingering threat.  Id. at 339. 
 The magistrate judge further found that while the 
defendants may be entitled to statutory immunity from state law 
liability for acts performed in the scope of their duties, they 
would not be entitled to immunity if they engaged in "willful 
misconduct."  Id. at 364.  Accordingly, the magistrate judge 
recommended that the court grant summary judgment on immunity 
grounds with respect to the state claims to those individual 
defendants involved only in the dropping of the explosive device.  
Id.  In these instances, the grant of summary judgment on the 
federal claims demonstrated that the conduct of these defendants 
did not, as a matter of state law, constitute "willful 
misconduct."  Id.  Conversely, he recommended that those 
defendants denied summary judgment on the federal claims also 
should be denied summary judgment for the state claims.  Id. 
 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 
recommendation as to the claims based on the dropping of the 
explosive device.  Id. at 338-39.  In reviewing the 
recommendation, however, the court "focused on the decision to 
let the fire burn at all."  Id.  The court stated: 
 I cannot conclude that there is a 
demonstration which leads to the judgment as 
a matter of law that it was reasonable as a 
  
matter of necessity, at the point after the 
bomb was dropped and when a flame was first 
visible, for the law enforcement officials to 
permit flame [sic] to continue until it 
totally consumed what remained of a bunker . 
. . .  That it might be convenient to have 
let the balance of the bunker be consumed by 
fire is perhaps a tenable view.  That it was 
necessary, in Tennessee v. Garner terms, I 
can find no basis for concluding. 
 
Id. at 340.  Thus, the court concurred with the magistrate 
judge's view that summary judgment should be denied to 
Commissioners Sambor and Richmond with respect to claims based on 
letting the fire burn.  Id. at 342, 347. 
 During oral argument the district court raised the 
question of "whether there was not some basis in the record for 
concluding that conceivably Managing Director Brooks concurred 
for a time in the decision to let the fire burn."  Id. at 342.  
Although Africa had not objected earlier to the magistrate 
judge's finding that he had not concurred in that decision, she 
decided to do so then.  Id.  In a further interview, Commissioner 
Sambor indicated that when he explained to Brooks that they were 
letting the fire burn the bunker, Brooks said, "only the bunker."  
Id. at 343.  Sambor said further that Brooks subsequently told 
him to put the fire out.  Attorneys for the city and for Brooks 
argued that the plaintiffs waived this issue and that no other 
evidence supports the allegation that Brooks was involved in the 
decision to let the fire burn.  The district court rejected these 
arguments and denied the summary judgment which Brooks sought on 
qualified immunity grounds with respect to claims based on the 
decision to let the fire burn.  Id. at 345, 347. 
  
 With regard to claims against the City of Philadelphia, 
the city first argued that only Mayor Goode and Managing Director 
Brooks had final decision-making authority and that it should not 
be held responsible for their subordinates' unapproved decisions.  
However, upon finding that Brooks could be denied qualified 
immunity, the city changed its position and argued that only 
Mayor Goode had final decision-making authority.  Id. at 345.  
The court reviewed the city's charter and concluded that the 
suability of either Managing Director Brooks or the two 
commissioners would be sufficient to hold the city suable on the 
federal claim.  Id. at 345-47. 
 The court also held, in accord with the magistrate 
judge's recommendation, that all defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment based on lack of evidence with respect to the 
plaintiffs' claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 
under section 1985(3).  In addition, the court held that the city 
was entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims because 
a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion established that the 
city council did not have the authority to expand the scope of 
the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.  This 
Supreme Court ruling was critical as the viability of the 
plaintiffs' state law claims depended on this expansion.   
 Finally, the court dismissed James' Fifth Amendment 
claim because she did not allege that she had pursued relief 
unsuccessfully under state law procedures such as those set forth 
by the Pennsylvania eminent domain code.  In re City of 
Philadelphia (James v. City of Philadelphia), No. 85-3528, slip 
  
op. at 11-13 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1994).  James pointed out that she 
had brought a federal suit, number 88-3881, for recovery of her 
property losses under federal and state law.  In that action she 
alleged that she was the only person whose property had been 
destroyed by the fire whom the city did not compensate and she 
asserted that such treatment was discriminatory.  Id.  In 
December 1988, the court dismissed number 88-3881 with prejudice 
as to the federal claims on the grounds that they were barred by 
the statute of limitations and it dismissed the state law claims 
without prejudice.  Id.  James did not appeal from that ruling.  
On January 3, 1994, one day before the district court rendered 
its bench opinion in the case currently before us, James filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration Nunc Pro Tunc of the 88-3881 decision 
under both docket numbers, 88-3881 and 85-3528.  The district 
court denied this motion, reasoning that it had been five years 
since the 88-3881 case had been decided and James had offered no 
new evidence or reasons for reexamining that decision.  Id. at 
13. 
 On motion by the City, the district court certified as 
final under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) the dismissal of all claims 
against Goode, Powell, Klein,6 Revel, Tursi, Connor, Demsko, and 
Reed.  App. at 682, 803.  In addition, the court certified for 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) the issue "of the suability of 
                     
6
.  Apparently, the district court has not certified as final 
under Rule 54(b) the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Officer Klein in the suit brought by Alfonso Leaphart.  This 
point is of no importance because no appeal has been taken from 
that order. 
  
the City of Philadelphia, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on claims 
arising from the decision to let the . . . fire burn."  Id. 
  
 C. The Issues on Appeal 
 Ramona Africa appeals from the district court's final  
order granting summary judgment in favor of Mayor Goode and 
Officers Powell and Klein.  Alfonso Leaphart appeals from the 
final judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Mayor Goode.  
Louise James appeals from the final judgment granting summary 
judgment in favor of Mayor Goode and Officer Powell7 and in favor 
of the City of Philadelphia with respect to the Fifth Amendment 
property claim.  James has appealed only from orders in the 85-
3528 case. 
 The City of Philadelphia appeals from the order denying 
its motion for summary judgment with respect to the federal 
claims based on section 1983.  Managing Director Brooks and 
Commissioners Sambor and Richmond appeal from the orders denying 
their motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds 
with respect to the claims based on the decision to let the fire 
burn and from the orders denying them summary judgment on the 
state claims.  We consolidated the appeals for briefing and 
argument.8 
                     
7
.  James' notice of appeal also states that she would be 
appealing the grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer 
Klein.  App. at 823.  I believe this is a clerical error because 
Officer Klein was not a defendant in her action and because she 
does not mention Officer Klein in her brief. 
8
.  The plaintiffs have not attempted to appeal from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the city on 
  
 
 III. JURISDICTION 
 The district court had jurisdiction over the federal 
civil rights claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights 
action) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction).  
The district court also had supplemental jurisdiction based upon 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the related state law claims. 
 
 A. Judgments Certified Under Rule 54(b) 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over 
the appeals from the grants of summary judgment which the 
district court certified as final judgments under Rule 54(b).  
Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368-69 (3d Cir. 1994).  These 
final judgments include grants of summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds with respect to all claims against Goode, 
Powell, Klein,9 Tursi, Revel, Connor, Demsko, and Reed.  As they 
are properly before us, I shall review Africa's appeal from the 
summary judgments in favor of Goode, Powell, and Klein; 
Leaphart's appeal from the summary judgment in favor of Goode; 
(..continued) 
the state claims.  Nor have any of the plaintiffs challenged on 
appeal the grant of summary judgment, on grounds of insufficient 
evidence, for all defendants as to claims based on alleged 
violations of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the MOVE 
members. 
9
.  As I have noted above, the district court certified as final 
under Rule 54(b) its grant of summary judgment as to Ramona 
Africa's claims against Officer Klein, but not as to Alfonso 
Leaphart's claims.  This decision, however, has not been 
appealed. 
  
and James' appeal from the summary judgment in favor of Goode and 
Powell. 
 
 B. Denial of Summary Judgment Certified Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
 In orders dated January 31, 1994, and February 1, 1994, 
the district court stated as follows: 
 It is DECLARED to be the opinion of this 
court that, within the intendment of 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b), (1) the issue, determined 
adversely to the City of Philadelphia . . . , 
of the suability of the City of Philadelphia, 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on claims 
arising from the decision to let the [MOVE] 
fire burn, is one which involves a 
controlling question of law as to which there 
is substantial ground for difference of 
opinion, and (2) that an immediate appeal 
from that aspect of the . . . order, taken in 
conjunction with anticipated appeals on 
related question of qualified immunity of 
certain individual defendants, may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation. 
 
App. at 682, 802-03.  This court then granted the city leave to 
appeal and thus we have jurisdiction over the city's appeal.   
 
 C. Denial of Summary Judgment on Qualified Immunity 
Grounds with Respect to Federal Claims 
 Generally, this court does not have jurisdiction to 
review the denial of summary judgment because such decisions are 
not final as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Giuffre v. Bissell, 
31 F.3d 1241, 1245 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 (1985), however, the Supreme 
  
Court held that a denial of summary judgment on the ground of 
qualified immunity is appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine.  "[A] decision of a district court is appealable if it 
falls within 'that small class which finally determine claims of 
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the 
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of 
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be 
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.'"  Id. at 524-25, 
105 S.Ct. at 2814 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225 (1949)). 
 The Court found that qualified immunity is "an 
entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of 
litigation" which would be "effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial."  Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 
2815.  Moreover, a district court's denial of qualified immunity 
would be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final 
judgment."  Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816.  The Court also found 
that this denial "conclusively determined the disputed question" 
of a defendant's right not to stand trial on the plaintiff's 
allegations, as required under Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978).  Finally, the Court 
determined that "a claim of immunity is conceptually distinct 
from the merits of the plaintiff's claim that his rights have 
been violated," thus satisfying the requirement of being 
"collateral" under Cohen.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 527-
28, 105 S.Ct. at 2816. 
  
 Therefore, we all agree that we have jurisdiction to 
consider the appeals taken by Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond from 
the district court's denial of summary judgment on qualified 
immunity grounds with respect to federal claims based on letting 
the fire burn.  See Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d at 1245; Hynson 
v. City of Chester Legal Dept., 864 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
 
 D. Denial of Summary Judgment on Immunity Grounds 
with Respect to State Law Claims 
 I now address the question of whether we have 
jurisdiction over the appeals from the district court's denial of 
summary judgment for Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond on the state 
law claims based on letting the fire burn.  I conclude that we do 
not have such jurisdiction and, as Judge Lewis agrees, he joins 
in the determination dismissing this aspect of the appeals.  The 
district court did not certify this order under either Rule 54(b) 
or section 1292(b).10  Nor, I think, is this issue so intertwined 
with those raised by the appeals properly before us that we 
should assert pendent appellate jurisdiction over it.  See 
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 
376, 382 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 
440, 449 (3d Cir. 1982). 
                     
10
.  I am not suggesting that the court could have certified the 
denial of summary judgment under Rule 54(b). 
  
 I therefore consider whether we may assert jurisdiction 
over these appeals under the collateral order doctrine.  In this 
inquiry Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, is instructive.  In 
that case, the district court denied qualified immunity to the 
defendant police officers on plaintiff's pendent tort claims 
under New Jersey law.  On appeal, this court noted that the 
determination of appellate jurisdiction over the state claims 
requires "(1) a predicate inquiry into whether the federal law of 
qualified official immunity ultimately governs appealability in 
this instance; and (2) a subsequent inquiry into the nature of 
the qualified immunity that New Jersey law confers upon state 
officials."  Id. at 1106. 
 In Brown this court concurred with the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that "the parties . . . 
in a federal action such as this one involving pendent state 
claims, are bound by federal procedural rules governing appeals, 
including the collateral order doctrine."  Id. (citing Sorey v. 
Kellett, 849 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 1988); Marrical v. Detroit 
News, Inc., 805 F.2d 169, 172 (6th Cir. 1986)).  However, it is 
state law that provides the substantive doctrine of immunity.  
The court also concluded that "the denial of a claim of qualified 
immunity premised upon state law is appealable only if the state 
has conferred an underlying substantive immunity from suits 
arising from the performance of official duties."  Id. at 1106-07 
(citing Marrical, 805 F.2d at 172; Sorey, 849 F.2d at 962).  It 
is immunity from suits, rather than mere immunity from liability, 
  
that would make such an order appealable.  Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 
F.3d at 1248.   
 In Brown v. Grabowski this court looked at the New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act, New Jersey case law on immunity, and New 
Jersey's doctrinal and procedural rules concerning interlocutory 
appeals to determine the scope of the state immunity.  922 F.2d 
at 1107.  Thus, here I look to the Pennsylvania law of official 
immunity to ascertain whether we have jurisdiction over the three 
officials' appeals from the denial of summary judgment on the 
state law claims arising from the decision to allow the fire to 
burn.   
 In this case, the district court did not elaborate on 
the state law claims but seemed to adopt the magistrate judge's 
approach.  The magistrate judge stated that although 
Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) 
grants immunity to the city's employees to the same extent that 
the city is immune, such immunity would not apply if "it is 
judicially determined that the act of the employee caused the 
injury and that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, 
actual malice or willful misconduct."  Africa II, 849 F. Supp. at 
364 (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8545 & 8550 (1982)).  
Thus, the magistrate judge recommended that those defendants who 
were to be granted summary judgment on claims based on dropping 
the explosive device and letting the fire burn should be entitled 
also to assert immunity under the PSTCA because "they have 
demonstrated, as a matter of law, that their conduct did not 
constitute a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful 
  
misconduct."  Id.  As to those defendants whose motions for 
summary judgment were to be denied as to claims based on letting 
the fire burn, however, the magistrate judge recommended that 
they be denied summary judgment on the state claims as well.  
This is because "they cannot show as matter of law that their 
decision did not constitute willful misconduct."  Id.   
 Although I do not find guidance on the point in the 
opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania has ruled that an order denying a summary 
judgment sought on statutory immunity grounds is not appealable 
immediately.  Bollinger v. Obrecht, 552 A.2d 359 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1989), appeal denied, 588 A.2d 511 (Pa. 1990).  This ruling 
strongly implies that such immunity is only from liability, 
despite the fact that the court went on to say it need not reach 
the issue of whether Pennsylvania law confers immunity from suit 
rather than from liability.  The Commonwealth Court noted that 
Pennsylvania courts have followed Cohen's collateral order 
doctrine but ruled that Mitchell v. Forsyth was not controlling 
because it involved only federal immunity.  Id. at 362-63.  Id. 
at 363 & n.5.  The court explained: 
 In Pennsylvania, immunity is governed by 
statute.  The merits of a plaintiff's cause 
of action against government agencies and 
officers are likewise governed by the same 
statute.  Thus, a trial court analyzing an 
immunity claim is actually deciding the same 
issues that will arise in the underlying 
action.  Unlike matters of federal official 
immunity, the trial court's interlocutory 
order denying an immunity claim under 
Pennsylvania law, is not separate from and 
collateral to the main cause of action. 
 
  
Id. at 363.  But as Mitchell noted, when immunity from suit is 
involved, the opposite result should be reached. 
 Later cases consistently have followed Bollinger v. 
Obrecht.  See, e.g., Farber v. Pennsbury Sch. Dist., 571 A.2d 546 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (quashing appeal as interlocutory from 
denial of motion for summary judgment on grounds of governmental 
immunity); Brown v. Philadelphia, 560 A.2d 309 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1989) (same), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 540 (Pa. 1991); McKinney v. 
Philadelphia, 552 A.2d 1169 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (same), aff'd, 
569 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1990); Gwiszcz v. Philadelphia, 550 A.2d 880 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (same).  Indeed, the language of the PSTCA 
supports the Commonwealth Court's reasoning as the act seems to 
be directed at liability, referring to immunity as only a defense 
to such liability rather than as a right to be free from suits.11 
                     
11
.  The relevant sections of the PSTCA read as follows: 
 
 § 8545. Official liability generally 
  An employee of a local agency is liable 
for civil damages on account of any injury to 
a person or property caused by acts of the 
employee which are within the scope of his 
office or duties only to the same extent as 
his employing local agency and subject to the 
limitations imposed by this subchapter. 
 
 § 8546. Defense of official immunity 
  In any action brought against an 
employee of a local agency for damages on 
account of an injury to a person or property 
based upon claims arising from, or reasonably 
related to, the office or the performance of 
the duties of the employee, the employee may 
assert on his own behalf, or the local agency 
may assert on his behalf: 
 
  (1) Defenses which are available at 
common law to the employee. 
  
 
 The fact that interlocutory orders may be appealable by 
permission of the appellate court, under the Pennsylvania Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, is irrelevant to my inquiry.  See Wareham 
v. Jeffes, 564 A.2d 1314, 1318 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (noting 
that denial of summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity 
would be interlocutory and unappealable except by permission).  
See also Lancie v. Giles, 572 A.2d 827, 829 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
(..continued) 
 
  (2) The defense that the conduct of the 
employee which gave rise to the claim was 
authorized or required by law, or that he in 
good faith reasonably believed the conduct 
was authorized or required by law. 
 
  (3) The defense that the act of the 
employee which gave rise to the claim was 
within the policymaking discretion granted to 
the employee by law.  For purposes of this 
subsection, all acts of members of the 
governing body of a local agency or of the 
chief executive officer thereof are deemed to 
be within the policymaking discretion granted 
to such person by law. 
 
 § 8550. Willful misconduct 
  In any action against a local agency or 
employee thereof for damages on account of an 
injury caused by the act of the employee in 
which it is judicially determined that the 
act of the employee caused the injury and 
that such act constituted a crime, actual 
fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct, 
the provisions of sections 8545 (relating to 
official liability generally), 8546 (relating 
to defense of official immunity), 8548 
(relating to indemnity) and 8549 (relating to 
limitation on damages) shall not apply. 
 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8545, 8546 & 8550 (1982). 
  
1990) (Commonwealth Court granted defendants permission to appeal 
from interlocutory order denying summary judgment on state 
statutory immunity grounds).12  First, whereas Pennsylvania 
appellate courts may grant permission to appeal from 
interlocutory and otherwise unappealable orders, absent a 
certification by the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we 
cannot do so.  In fact, the exercise of discretion to withhold 
such permission effectively will negate a claim of immunity from 
suit.  Second, as we stated in Brown v. Grabowski, federal rules 
govern this federal action.  922 F.2d at 1106.  Therefore, 
Bollinger v. Obrecht is dispositive here.  To recap, under Brown 
v. Grabowski, the right to an interlocutory appeal "can only 
exist where the state has extended an underlying substantive 
right to be free from the burdens of litigation,"  922 F.2d at 
1107 (quoting Marrical, 805 F.2d at 172).  Bollinger demonstrates 
that Pennsylvania has not done that.  Thus, because immunity is 
not a separate or collateral issue from the underlying claim 
under Pennsylvania law, we have no jurisdiction over the appeals 
by Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond from the district court's order 
denying them summary judgment on the state law claims.  We 
therefore will dismiss their appeals from the district court's 
orders denying summary judgment as to the state law claims. 
                     
12
.  Because that case involved both federal qualified immunity 
and state statutory immunity, the court also noted in dictum that 
given Bollinger's holding, "[w]here the motion is partially based 
on qualified immunity, the issue becomes more difficult in light 
of the U.S. Supreme Court's emphasis on the appealability of 
denials of summary judgment as a necessary part of fulfilling the 
purpose of qualified immunity."  Lancie v. Giles, 572 A.2d at 829 
n.3 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806). 
  
 
 E. Grant of Summary Judgment with Respect to James' 
Property Claims in Favor of the City 
 James appeals from the district court's grant of 
partial summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia 
with respect to her claim based on the uncompensated destruction 
of property.  James argues that in refusing to compensate her on 
the same basis as her neighbors, the city discriminated against 
her and has been enriched unjustly at her expense.  We all agree, 
however, that James has not set forth any jurisdictional basis 
which permits us to consider her property arguments as there are 
claims remaining in the district court and thus her appeal is not 
from a final judgment. 
 As I indicated above, James brought a separate federal 
civil rights suit, number 88-3881, seeking damages for her 
property, the thrust of which was that her treatment, "as 
allegedly the only person in the neighborhood of destroyed houses 
or damaged houses who was not offered to be compensated . . . , 
was discriminatory in terms that were unconstitutional."  App. at 
815.  The court dismissed these federal claims with prejudice 
because they were barred by the statute of limitations and it 
dismissed the state claims without prejudice.  James did not 
appeal from this judgment. 
 In the case now before us, number 85-3528, the 
magistrate judge recommended that the court grant partial summary 
judgment as to the property issue in favor of the city because 
the takings claim could not stand "without an appropriate 
  
allegation of unsuccessful resort to state procedures pursuant to 
Pennsylvania's eminent domain code."  Id.  James, however, asked 
the district court either to disregard the recommendation or to 
reopen the 1988 case, nunc pro tunc, because she believed the 
court had decided it erroneously.  Id.  The district court agreed 
with the magistrate judge's recommendation and declined to reopen 
the 1988 case. 
 James' present appeal is from the decision rendered in 
number 85-3528 as her notice of appeal makes no mention of number 
88-3881.  Consequently, she cannot contest directly the court's 
refusal to reconsider the 1988 case.  Nevertheless, what James 
argues now is strongly reminiscent of her allegations in the 1988 
suit -- that the denial of compensation for her property is 
discriminatory and violates her equal protection and First 
Amendment rights and that the city has been enriched unjustly.  
James devotes a large part of her appellate effort to the 
allegations that she has been denied equal protection and has 
been the victim of unlawful discrimination.  She asserts 
repeatedly that she is "a member of the class of individuals, 
such class consisting of the victims of the Osage Avenue fire."  
James Br. at 37, 38.  She directs this argument to the magistrate 
judge's conclusion that she neither has alleged nor shown that 
the city's action was "based on any class-based invidiously 
discriminatory animus."  See app. at 792-93.13  However, the 
                     
13
.  Actually it is difficult to see how there can be merit to 
this claim as all the other homeowners received compensation. 
  
magistrate judge made this statement in explaining why the claims 
under section 1985(3) on behalf of James' deceased son must fail.  
Thus, his comments were not addressed to her property claim in 
case 85-3528.  These misdirected arguments by James support the 
city's suggestion that she is attempting to incorporate the 
number 88-3881 case into the present one.  To the extent that 
James is attempting now to appeal from that December 1988 
dismissal, we must reject the attempt for lack of jurisdiction.  
See United States v. Rivera Const. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 298-99 (3d 
Cir. 1988) ("where the order or judgment upon which the appellant 
seeks review is neither directly nor indirectly referred to in 
the notice of appeal, then the issue is not fairly raised and the 
Court of Appeals does not acquire jurisdiction").   
 Furthermore, we see no basis to exercise jurisdiction 
over James' appeal from the judgment in favor of the city in 
number 85-3528 on the uncompensated destruction of property 
claims.  The collateral order doctrine has nothing to do with the 
claim and the district court did not enter a certification with 
respect to the order under either Rule 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b).   
  
 F. Scope of Appellate Review 
 We exercise plenary review over all appeals properly 
before us because they are all from grants or denials of summary 
judgment.  See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-
Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 
S.Ct. 554 (1993) (grant of summary judgment); Giuffre v. Bissell, 
  
31 F.3d at 1251 (denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds); Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(in banc) (same).  Moreover, we have plenary review over the 
grant or denial of qualified immunity because it is an issue of 
law.  Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d at 1254.  Thus, I will consider 
whether there are genuine issues as to material facts and whether 
the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
 
 IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
 Courts determine whether a defendant is entitled to 
qualified immunity by balancing the important policy of 
compensating individuals for deprivation of their rights against 
"the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their 
discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the 
vigorous exercise of official authority."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732 (1982) (quoting Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910 (1978)).  In 
making this balance, courts recognize that officials often must 
"act swiftly and firmly at the risk that action deferred will be 
futile or constitute virtual abdication of office."  Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 246, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1691 (1974).  Thus, 
"government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
  
known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 
2738. 
 Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 
1793 (1991), instructs that before a court addresses a claim of 
qualified immunity, it first should determine whether a plaintiff 
has alleged "a violation of a constitutional right at all."  See 
Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d at 606 n.7; D.R. by L.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (in banc), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1045 (1993).  
Deciding "this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously 
to weed out suits which fail the test without requiring a 
defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in 
expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on 
its merits."  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 
1793. 
 Furthermore, for there to be liability, the right 
alleged to have been violated "must have been 'clearly 
established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, 
sense."  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 
3034, 3039 (1987).  While the abstract right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure clearly is established, for qualified 
immunity purposes the right must be considered on a more specific 
level: "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right."  Id. 
 Consequently, I consider whether the particularized 
constitutional right asserted was "'clearly established' at the 
  
time the defendants acted."  Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d at 606 
(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 1793); 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 817-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.  If 
the law is not established clearly when an official acts, he is 
entitled to qualified immunity because he "could not reasonably 
be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor 
could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct 
not previously identified as unlawful."  Id.  On the other hand, 
if the law was established clearly, the official still may obtain 
qualified immunity if he claims "extraordinary circumstances and 
can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the 
relevant legal standard."  Id.  In other words, "[d]efendants 
will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that 
no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that [the 
action was lawful]; but if officers of reasonable competence 
could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized."14  
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986). 
                     
14
.  Some of the decisions of this court may have rephrased this 
test in that they may be read to place a heavier burden on the 
official seeking immunity than is warranted by the Supreme 
Court's formulation of the issue.  In Good v. Dauphin County 
Social Serv., this court accurately described the test as whether 
"reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant 
time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided 
case law, that their conduct would be lawful."  891 F.2d at 1092 
(emphasis added).  This court later misquoted Good, however, to 
say that "qualified immunity does not apply if 'reasonable 
officials in the defendants' position at the relevant time could 
have believed, in light of what was in the decided case law, that 
their conduct would be unlawful.'"  Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 
195, 202 (3d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 
F.3d at 616 (quoting Abdul-Akbar v. Watson).  My point is that 
reasonable officials could believe that a certain course of 
conduct is unlawful and they also might believe it is lawful.  
  
 
 A. Allegation of a Constitutional Violation 
 In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 
1871 (1989), the Court held "that all claims that law enforcement 
officers have used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the 
course of an arrest, investigation stop, or other 'seizure' of a 
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 
its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive 
due process' approach."  Thus, the general right central to this 
case is the right to be free from unreasonable seizure of the 
person under the Fourth Amendment, in particular seizure with 
unreasonable force.   
 Siegert v. Gilley, however, demands more than 
conclusory allegations that defendants violated a certain 
constitutional right.  For example, Siegert asserted that his 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment were 
violated when Gilley maliciously made unkind comments regarding 
his abilities to a prospective employer.  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 
U.S. at 232, 111 S.Ct. at 1793.  Because defamation is not a 
constitutional deprivation, the Supreme Court concluded that 
Siegert failed not only to allege a violation of a clearly 
(..continued) 
Thus, though unintended, these cases could support a rule that 
would deny immunity even when "officers of reasonable competence 
could disagree on this issue," so long as a reasonable officer 
could believe that the conduct would be unlawful.  See Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. at 1096.  This reading would 
place a greater burden on the officials to demonstrate that they 
have qualified immunity than is warranted.  Of course, to the 
extent that such reading conflicts with Supreme Court precedents, 
it cannot be followed.  Good properly states the law. 
  
established constitutional right but failed to allege a 
"violation of any constitutional right at all."  Id. at 233-34, 
111 S.Ct. at 1794.  Similarly, in D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., two public school students sued 
because some of their classmates allegedly molested them.  972 
F.2d at 1364.  This court accepted the plaintiffs' statement that 
they had a "liberty interest in their personal bodily integrity 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment," but held that the 
school's alleged conduct did not amount to a constitutional 
violation.  972 F.2d at 1368. 
 In essence, here the plaintiffs allege that the 
defendants exerted excessive force in attempting to arrest 
plaintiff Africa and decedents Leaphart and James, by dropping 
the explosive on the roof of the MOVE residence and by letting 
the fire burn.  On the face of the complaint, I believe 
plaintiffs have met the threshold required by Siegert v. Gilley 
by alleging a constitutional violation.  Judges Scirica and Lewis 
agree with this conclusion. 
 
 B. Violation of a Constitutional Right 
 I now consider on the undisputed facts, Melo v. Hafer, 
13 F.3d at 745; Good v. Dauphin County Social Serv., 891 F.2d at 
1094-95, whether the individual defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity.  In this section, "B. Violation of a 
Constitutional Right," I write only for myself.  First, I ask 
whether plaintiff Africa and decedents Leaphart and James 
possessed a "clearly established" constitutional right to be free 
  
from the forces allegedly exerted by the individual defendants 
under the circumstances that existed on May 13, 1985.  As the 
defendants point out, they did not direct force at the person of 
any of the prospective arrestees.  Rather, they directed the 
force at destruction of property so that police officers could 
inject tear gas into the house to effect a peaceful arrest -- one 
in which neither police officers nor MOVE members would be 
injured seriously.  There is no evidence on the substantially 
developed record that anyone intended otherwise.  In fact, there 
is evidence indicating that the defendants were concerned with 
not harming the people inside the house.  
 The district court, however, refused to consider the 
officials' argument that they intended only to destroy the 
bunker.  See Africa II, 849 F. Supp. at 341-42.  The court stated 
that Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, requires use 
of an "objective legal reasonableness" test in a Fourth Amendment 
excessive force case.  While this formulation is accurate, I 
disagree with its application by the district court.  In Graham 
v. Connor, the plaintiff allegedly sustained physical injuries 
when police officers grabbed and cuffed him, threw him on his 
companion's car, and threw him headfirst into the police car.  
Id. at 389-90, 109 S.Ct. at 1868.  Thus, as is usually true in 
excessive force cases, the police officers' intent to apply force 
to the person of Graham was clear.  The Supreme Court held that 
the court of appeals erred when it considered whether the 
officers "acted in good faith or maliciously and sadistically for 
the very purpose of causing harm," as the case should have been 
  
analyzed under a Fourth Amendment "objective reasonableness" 
standard.  Id. at 395-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, although the Supreme Court 
did find the "underlying intent or motivation" irrelevant, this 
reference was to the officers' motivations for carrying out the  
direct application of the force to the arrestee's person.  Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872.  But here the 
issue before us concerns the more fundamental question of whether 
the officers applied force to the MOVE members at all. 
 On this point, another Supreme Court decision, Brower 
v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S.Ct. 1378 (1989), is 
instructive.  In that case, the plaintiffs brought a section 1983 
action alleging that the police effected an unreasonable seizure 
of the decedent by putting up a roadblock into which the decedent 
fatally crashed the stolen car he was driving.  Id. at 594, 109 
S.Ct. at 1380.  The Supreme Court explained: 
 [A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur 
whenever there is a governmentally caused 
termination of an individual's freedom of 
movement . . . , nor even whenever there is a 
governmentally caused and governmentally 
desired termination of an individual's 
freedom of movement . . . , but only when 
there is a governmental termination of 
freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied. 
 
Id. at 596-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1381.  In that case, the Court held 
that there was a Fourth Amendment seizure because the decedent 
was stopped by the blockade, "the very instrumentality set in 
motion or put in place in order to achieve that result."  Id. at 
599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382. 
  
 But this case is different, as the officials did not 
intend to apply any force to the persons of the MOVE members when 
they dropped the explosive device and allowed the fire to burn.  
Thus, while their subjective thoughts as to the lawfulness of 
their conduct is irrelevant under Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3040, what is not irrelevant is the 
officials' intention only to destroy the bunker and perhaps part 
of the roof so that they could inject tear gas into the house. 
 In my analysis, I ask whether it is enough for a Fourth 
Amendment seizure that the MOVE members were stopped by "the very 
instrumentality set in motion or put in place [the destruction of 
the bunker] in order to achieve that result."  Brower v. County 
of Inyo, 489 U.S. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382.  The Supreme Court 
cautioned that "[i]n determining whether the means that 
terminates the freedom of movement is the very means that the 
government intended we cannot draw too fine a line."  Id. at 598, 
109 S.Ct. 1382.  In this sense, a court must look to the 
officials' intent of why they wanted to destroy the bunker and to 
create a hole in the roof to see whether the destruction of the 
bunker was set in motion "in order to achieve" the seizure.15  
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.  I also point out that the defendants' contention that they 
intended the fire to be localized would not necessarily be 
conclusive on the issue of what their intent really was.  Thus, a 
court could find in a case in which a massive force was used to 
achieve a limited result that the officials' intent was to 
effectuate a seizure with the use of the force.  In this case, 
however, there is no basis to conclude that the defendants' 
intent in dropping the explosive or allowing the fire to burn was 
other than to permit the introduction of the tear gas.   
 
     Nor is this a case in which the police action was "likely to 
cause injury to the occupants" of the residence.  Carroll v. 
  
The destruction of the bunker was obviously a part of the 
officials' day-long effort to seize the MOVE members, but none of 
the officials intended it in itself to effectuate the seizure.  
Nor could they reasonably have intended the destruction of the 
bunker alone to be conclusive in any way, even though it may well 
have been reasonable to believe, as they did believe, that its 
destruction was an important objective.   
 Thus, this case differs from Brower because there the 
police set up the blockade to stop a motoring felon.  
Consequently, in Brower, the decedent "was meant to be stopped by 
the physical obstacle of the roadblock -- and . . . he was so 
stopped."  Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382.  But in this case, it 
cannot be said that the defendants intended to seize the MOVE 
members by destroying the bunker.  Nor were they so seized.  From 
the allegations and the evidence on record, we only can say that 
those who were alive immediately before 5:30 that afternoon were 
seized, i.e. killed, not by the explosive, nor by the burning of 
the bunker, but by the fire that continued despite efforts of the 
fire department.  See Carroll v. Borough of State College, 854 F. 
Supp. 1184, 1190 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that to constitute 
(..continued) 
Borough of State College, 854 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (M.D. Pa. 
1994), aff'd,      F.3d      (3d Cir. 1995) (table); see 
typescript at 14-16 (officials reasonably believed risk of fire 
was negligible and fire, once started, could be contained); 
typescript at 60 (officials had no reason to know that fire could 
lead to serious injury).  Therefore, we are not presented with a 
situation where the defendants' subjective intent is at odds with 
the objective likelihood that injury would result from their 
actions.  I need not decide how I would consider the case if we 
were presented with such facts. 
  
seizure, police action must be "direct" cause of injury), aff'd,        
F.3d      (3d Cir. 1995) (table). 
 Accordingly, this is a case of "a governmentally caused 
and [perhaps] governmentally desired termination of an 
individual's freedom of movement," but not "through means 
intentionally applied."  See id. at 597, 109 S.Ct. at 1381 
(emphasis omitted).  Consequently, there was no Fourth Amendment 
seizure in this case.  Thus, on this ground alone I am 
constrained to vote to reverse the district court's denial of 
qualified immunity to Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond, and to affirm 
the district court insofar as it granted the other defendants 
qualified immunity.  In my view what it gets down to, after years 
of litigation, is uncomplicated:  the plaintiffs have no federal 
case against any defendant by reason of any injury Ramona Africa 
may have suffered or by reason of the deaths of John and Frank 
Africa because there was no seizure.  The determinative legal 
issue is as simple as that. 
 In reaching this result I take note of Fagan v. City of 
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1305 n.5. (3d Cir. 1994) (in banc), in 
which we considered a police pursuit case under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that if there is not 
a seizure a substantive due process "shocks the conscience" claim 
may be asserted against the police.  See also Carroll v. Borough 
of State College, 854 F. Supp. at 1192 n.8.  In this case, 
however, I do not consider whether we could undertake a due 
process clause analysis as the plaintiffs present their cases as 
involving excessive force under the Fourth Amendment rather than 
  
as implicating substantive due process principles.  Indeed, in 
her reply brief, Ramona Africa expressly contested the argument 
some of the defendants advanced that we should apply the "shocks 
the conscience" test we adopted in Fagan.16 
 Nevertheless, Fagan is significant here for a different 
reason.  Fagan involved a high speed chase resulting in death and 
injuries both to innocent third parties and to persons in the 
vehicle the police were pursuing when the pursued vehicle hit a 
truck.  Thus, there can be no doubt that there was in Fagan, in 
the words of Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. at 596-97, 109 
S.Ct. at 1381, a government caused and desired termination of an 
individual's freedom of movement.  Yet not a single member of our 
sharply divided in banc court in Fagan suggested that the proper 
analysis in that case should have centered on the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures.  Rather, we 
divided on whether to recover under the substantive due process 
clause, the plaintiffs had to present proofs satisfying the 
"shocks the conscience" standard or whether "reckless 
indifference" was sufficient.  In so defining the issue we were 
undoubtedly correct because Fagan did not involve, in the words 
of Brower, "a governmental termination of freedom of movement 
through means intentionally applied."  Id.  That Fagan did not 
involve such a termination is obvious as the police did not 
                     
16
.  In any event, in view of my conclusions, with respect to the 
reasonableness of the defendants' activities, it is evident that 
I would conclude that the city defendants did not engage in 
conduct which "shocks the conscience." 
  
intend that the fleeing driver stop his vehicle by colliding with 
another vehicle.  Thus, Fagan differed from Brower because in 
Brower the police set up the blockade to stop the decedent and it 
did so.  The difference between the cases was so clear that in 
Fagan we did not even discuss Brower. 
 I point out the foregoing because if, as is the case, 
this court unanimously treated the situation in Fagan as not 
involving a seizure even though the collision was a direct 
product of the chase, then how could this case possibly involve a 
seizure?  The answer is manifest:  there was no seizure here.  
The city defendants no more intended to burn down the building 
than the Fagan defendants intended to cause a crash.  If we were 
to hold otherwise we would have to conclude that every member of 
this court undertook an incomplete analysis in Fagan.  While I 
recognize that the significance of Fagan is somewhat diminished 
by the circumstance that on appeal the plaintiffs there asserted 
only due process constitutional contentions, nevertheless we as a 
panel should give the greatest respect to our recent unanimous in 
banc analysis in Fagan.17   
 
 C. Excessive Force 
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.  In fact, the district court in Fagan explicitly held that 
"[n]o seizure occurred in this case," Fagan v. City of Vineland, 
804 F. Supp. 591, 598 n.6 (D.N.J. 1992), and the plaintiffs did 
not appeal from the finding, which, after Brower, clearly was 
correct.  See also Campbell v. White, 916 F.2d 421, 423, (7th 
Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 922, 111 S.Ct. 1314 (1991); 
Frye v. Town of Akron, 759 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 
  
 I will now assume that there was a Fourth Amendment 
seizure.  I nevertheless conclude that the city defendants are 
entitled to qualified immunity as their acts were reasonable as a 
matter of law.  Judge Scirica joins in this section, "C. 
Excessive Force," but only for the limited purpose of agreeing 
that Tennessee v. Garner is inapplicable and that the appropriate 
inquiry is the reasonableness of the city defendants' acts.  He 
thus disagrees with my conclusion that the city defendants are 
not liable for a Fourth Amendment violation on the basis of their 
acts being reasonable as a matter of law.  Nevertheless, I 
conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation and under 
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. at 231, 111 S.Ct. at 1793, the 
defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the federal 
claims. 
 As indicated, the magistrate judge concluded and the 
district court agreed, that "a reasonable person in each of the 
defendant's positions could have believed that the use of an 
explosive device . . . was necessary to 'prevent death or serious 
bodily injury' to the police officers on the scene or other 
person."  Africa II, 849 F. Supp. at 337, 357 (citing Tennessee 
v. Garner).  With regard to the fire, the magistrate judge did 
not address explicitly the reasonableness of the decision to let 
the fire consume the bunker but found that "after the fire had 
destroyed the roof-top bunker, there remained [no] reasonable 
basis for the police to believe that allowing the fire to burn 
was necessary to quell some perceived imminent peril."  Africa 
II, 849 F. Supp. at 359.  The defendants point out, however, that 
  
the record includes no evidence that the officials allowed the 
fire to burn after it had consumed the bunker.  The district 
court held that letting the fire burn at all, regardless of 
whether it was intended only to destroy the bunker, as a matter 
of law, was not "reasonable as a matter of necessity."  Africa 
II, 849 F. Supp. at 340.  The court drew this conclusion from the 
facts that apparently no MOVE member had been using the bunker 
offensively after the police dropped the explosive, that Brooks 
saw no sign of life on the roof except a dog, and that the 
bunker, "under Managing Director Brooks' perception, [was] 
substantially neutralized on the impact of the bomb."  Id.18  
Thus, the court stated, "[t]hat it might be convenient to have 
let the balance of the bunker be consumed by fire is perhaps a 
tenable view.  That it was necessary, in Tennessee v. Garner 
terms, I can find no basis for concluding."  Id. 
 The district court erred in applying Tennessee v. 
Garner to require that the use of force be necessary in this 
case.  Just as an application of "deadly force" may not result in 
death, the fact that a seizure results in death does not 
                     
18
.  In his opinion Judge Lewis indicates that the "intention of 
the defendant officials in dropping the explosive device [and] to 
blast the bunker from atop the roof . . . must be considered in 
light of the fact that the defendant officials had no way of 
knowing whether the bunker was occupied at the time the explosive 
device was deployed."  Typescript at 3.  This statement is wrong 
for, as the district court explained, nothing in the record 
demonstrates that the bunker had been used at all for a 
substantial time before the dropping of the bomb.  Africa II, 849 
F. Supp. at 340.  Obviously the defendants who had the premises 
under constant observation thought that the bunker was empty when 
Powell dropped the device and that was the fact. 
  
necessarily mean that "deadly force" has been applied.  See, 
e.g., Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909, 912-13 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that "deadly force" was not used when police dog attack 
resulted in death of suspected felon); Ryder v. City of Topeka, 
814 F.2d 1412, 1416-17 & n.11 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
gunshot which did not kill suspect constitutes "deadly force").  
For example, the Model Penal Code defines "deadly force" as 
"force which the actor uses with the purpose of causing or which 
he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious 
bodily harm."  Model Penal Code § 3.11(2) (1994); see also 
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(applying Model Penal Code definition to find police dog attack 
not application of deadly force); Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 
at 912-13 (same).  In dropping the explosive on the roof and 
letting the fire consume the bunker, the city defendants did not 
act with the "purpose of causing . . . death or serious bodily 
harm" to the MOVE members in the house but only with the purpose 
of destroying the bunker.  Nor did they have reason to "know" 
that such actions would "create a substantial risk of causing 
death or serious bodily harm."  Therefore, the district court 
simply should have asked whether, in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, the use of such force was reasonable.19   
                     
19
.  Judge Lewis concludes that the individual defendants used 
deadly force and that therefore Tennessee v. Garner applies.  But 
in reaching his conclusion that the individual defendants had 
reason to know that their actions created a substantial risk of 
causing death or serious bodily harm, Judge Lewis relies more on 
his intuitive sense of what the police and firefighters "must" 
have known than on an analysis of what the record evidence shows 
in this case.  See Judge Lewis' dissent at 2 ("[t]he force 
  
 In Brower v. County of Inyo, the Supreme Court stated 
that to have a claim under section 1983, plaintiffs must allege 
that the seizure was unreasonable, which they did in that case by 
alleging that the roadblock was set in a way likely to kill the 
decedent.  Id. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382-83.  In instructing on 
how a court should consider the reasonableness of the seizure, 
the Court said: 
 This should be contrasted with the situation 
that would obtain if the sole claim of 
unreasonableness were that there was no 
probable cause for the stop.  In that case, 
if [decedent] had had the opportunity to stop 
voluntarily at the roadblock, but had 
negligently or intentionally driven into it, 
then, because of lack of proximate causality, 
respondents, though responsible for depriving 
him of his freedom of movement, would not be 
liable for his death. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 Application of the reasonableness standard in a Fourth 
Amendment seizure case "requires careful attention to the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity 
(..continued) 
embodied in the incendiary device and in the fire was, by any 
sensible standard, 'deadly' force"; Dissent at 3 ("To me, this 
constitutes deadly force, for I cannot imagine how anyone can 
conclude that a device such as this was not capable of taking 
human life -- which, in fact, it ultimately did."); Dissent at 3 
("I believe the city defendants, who were professional law 
enforcement and fire-fighting personnel, had every reason to know 
that their actions created a substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily injury to the MOVE members . . . .")  Notwithstanding 
Judge Lewis' intuitions, the record in this case, as detailed in 
the text, indicates that quite the opposite is true:  The police 
and firefighters had every reason to believe that their actions 




of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
flight."  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872.20  
Moreover, the standard of reasonableness "must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than 
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."  Id.  The various officers' 
and officials' intents and motives are irrelevant.  Id. at 397, 
109 S.Ct. at 1872.  In reviewing the officers' actions, a court 
should bear in mind that "great weight is given to his 
determination and the matter is to be judged on the facts as they 
appeared then and not merely in the light of the event."  Scheuer 
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 248, 94 S.Ct. at 1692 (quoting Moyer v. 
Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85, 29 S.Ct. 235, 237 (1909)). 
 I therefore examine first the information possessed by 
the various officials at the time of the events at issue to 
determine if their conduct was objectively reasonable.  See 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3040.  In 
this objective reasonableness analysis, I primarily consider the 
case from the perspective of Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond as they 
were the supervisory officials on the site.  It is fair to say 
that at the beginning of May 13, 1985, the defendants knew or 
reasonably believed the following: (1) MOVE had been involved in 
                     
20
.  Although the Court decided Graham v. Connor four years after 
the MOVE confrontation, it still controls our determination of 
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation.  Only when we 
decide whether the law was established clearly do we need to 
limit our survey of the law to that which predates May 13, 1985. 
  
a prior episode of violence against the police which resulted in 
a death of a police officer; (2) at least one MOVE member had 
been seen earlier with a gun; (3) MOVE members had threatened 
police officers and neighbors with violence and use of guns and 
explosives; (4) MOVE members may have dug tunnels under their 
house; and (5) it was likely that MOVE members would resist 
arrest. 
 From their experiences on the morning of May 13, 1985, 
it is fair to say that these same defendants knew or reasonably 
believed the following: (1) certain MOVE members expressed that 
they would not surrender peacefully and threatened to kill the 
police officers; (2) certain MOVE members were shooting at the 
police; (3) some of the gunfire seemed to have come from the 
bunker atop the roof; (4) efforts at creating holes on the sides 
of the MOVE house and injecting tear gas into the house were 
unsuccessful; (5) there were children in the basement of the MOVE 
house; and (6) MOVE members have made no signs that they were 
willing to surrender. 
 It is simply beyond argument that a reasonable officer 
on the scene possessing the above information would believe that 
there were armed and dangerous people inside the MOVE house who 
posed a serious threat to the life and safety of officers and 
neighbors, should they escape.  Furthermore, although the 
plaintiffs contend that there had been no gunfire from the MOVE 
house for hours before the use of the explosive, I believe this 
fact, if true, would be irrelevant.  No reasonable officer would 
think that the danger finally had subsided and that police 
  
officers could come to the house safely and arrest the occupants 
merely because the MOVE members had held their fire for several 
hours.21   
 Of course, it is irrelevant that only a few weapons 
were found in the rubble afterwards, that Ramona Africa never 
fired a gun, and that Ramona Africa was not involved in the 1978 
confrontation.  The first two allegations are not something that 
any of the officials or officers had any reason to know with any 
degree of certainty at the time and, in any event, a person with 
a single weapon can fire a fatal shot.  Thus, this case would be 
no different even if the defendants believed all along that there 
were only a few weapons in the premises.  The allegations 
regarding Africa's peaceful nature are also irrelevant because 
even if the defendants were aware of them, they would have been 
justified in believing that the other persons in the house were 
armed and dangerous.22  The presence of one peacefully inclined 
occupant could have in no way impacted on the overall situation. 
                     
21
.  I thus find Judge Lewis' assertion that because "several 
hours had elapsed between the cessation of gunfire from within 
the MOVE dwelling and the dropping of the incendiary device by 
the police" to be beside the point.  Dissent at 10-11.  The fact 
of the matter is that, in light of the massive gun battle earlier 
in the day, which in turn must be seen in light of MOVE members' 
consistent threatening conduct, the police had every reason to 
believe that the MOVE members could begin shooting again at any 
moment.  It seems self-evident to me that the inquiry should 
focus on the police officers' reasonable belief about the threat 
of violence, not on the fortuitous fact that at the moment the 
bomb was dropped bullets were not descending from the building. 
22
.  In fact she was not inclined peacefully as, according to 
certain of the briefs, she was convicted of riot and conspiracy 
for her participation in this episode.   
  
 Once it was clear that the insertion teams could not 
complete their mission, and that the MOVE members still were not 
cooperating, it cannot be said that it was anything but 
reasonable for the officials to develop alternative ways to 
proceed in their mission to arrest these dangerous people.  Nor 
can it be said that it was unreasonable for the defendants to 
choose to attempt to conclude the stand-off, or at least destroy 
the bunker, by sundown given the higher risks they perceived to 
be coming with nightfall.23 
 The record shows that the defendants had discussed 
various ways of neutralizing the bunker, which all perceived as a 
great danger to the officers below, and of effectively inserting 
tear gas into the house.  And when they focused on the option of 
using a helicopter to drop an explosive on the bunker to 
neutralize it and to create a hole in the roof, they also 
discussed the potential for fire and for injury to the people in 
the house.  They believed from their inquiries of Powell, an 
officer in the Bomb Squad, that these risks were very low.  Was 
this belief reasonable given the fact that at least certain of 
the defendants had known that there was a possibility, or at 
least a threat by MOVE, that there was incendiary and/or 
explosive materials in the house?  I cannot say that a reasonable 
officer could not have held such a belief that the risks were 
                     
23
.  While Judge Lewis concludes that the individual defendants 
used excessive force, he offers no explanation of what 
alternatives were available.  Apparently he is willing to have 
mandated an indefinite standoff. 
  
low.  First, the defendants were entitled to rely on the 
statements of Officer Powell regarding the characteristics of the 
explosive.  Second, explosives had been used on the sides of the 
house in the morning without causing any fires.  And third, these 
officials believed that they had seen muzzle flashes on the roof, 
which could have led them to believe that a small spark may not 
be terribly dangerous, especially given the fact that the roof 
had been well doused with water all day.  Thus, I do not think it 
unreasonable for them to have believed that explosives could be 
used to eliminate the bunker.24 
 I believe that the decision to let the fire consume the 
bunker was not an unreasonable use of force.  Barna v. City of 
Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 820 (3d Cir. 1994).  There is no 
question that the bunker still was standing after the explosive 
was deployed.  In fact, the explosive missed it altogether.  The 
only basis in the record for the district court's conclusion that 
the bunker was "substantially neutralized on the impact of the 
bomb," appears to derive from Brooks' testimony.  Brooks 
testified that when he told Sambor to put the fire out, he said, 
"[Y]ou've accomplished your mission, put out the fire."  App. at 
1016.  That the bunker substantially was neutralized was, as I 
                     
24
.  Nor am I persuaded to reach a different conclusion by the 
fact that the satchel contained certain explosive materials 
generally used only by the military.  Whatever was in the satchel 
was not enough to do much structural damage upon explosion since 
the bunker was still standing.  To say that the explosive was 
"military strength," I believe, is quite misleading. 
  
read the record, solely Brooks' expectation of the effect of the 
explosive.  Brooks testified: 
  Q. Now, when you say the bomb would 
neutralize the bunker even if it didn't knock 
it off, what do you mean? 
 
  A. It would be very difficult to stay 
up there. 
 
  Q. Well, did you feel there was any 
discussion that if there were any human being 
inside that bunker, he would be injured or 
killed to the point or injured to the point 
that he would not be able to take offensive 
action? 
 
  A. I think so. 
 
App. at 986.  The district court incorrectly concluded from 
Brooks' statements that the explosion in fact neutralized the 
bunker.   
 Furthermore, there is no evidence that either Sambor or 
Richmond believed the bunker had been neutralized when they 
agreed to let the fire burn it.  Looking from each defendant's 
position, a court must assess the reasonableness of the actions 
of Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond based on the information and 
beliefs they each held at the time.  A court must take care not 
to impute one official's beliefs and information to another 
official to hold his actions unreasonable in the circumstances.  
In this case, I see that although Brooks may have thought that 
the mission was accomplished by the explosion, Sambor and 
Richmond believed differently.  In Brooks' case, then, it may be 
rational to go on to determine whether letting the fire burn down 
a seemingly neutralized bunker was reasonable.  But a reasonable 
  
official in the position of the other officials surely did not 
have to have this state of mind.  Both Sambor and Richmond were 
on the street when Brooks called them about the fire.  They 
testified that they saw smoke, but no flames.  And the bunker 
still was standing.  From Sambor's and Richmond's point of view, 
the explosive did not neutralize the bunker, thus explaining the 
need to "get the bunker."  There may not have been anyone in the 
bunker after the explosion, but this was also the case before the 
explosion.  Surely this fact cannot be taken as assurance that no 
one would emerge soon from inside the house and perhaps resume 
the offensive position taken in the morning.  Indeed, the 
district court implicitly found, and I concur, that the absence 
of people on the roof or in the bunker did not render 
unreasonable the earlier decision to use the explosive to "get 
the bunker."  This same reasoning should apply after the 
explosion.  The bunker, for these two officials, was still as 
justifiable a target as it was before the explosion. 
 Thus, the question for Sambor and Richmond becomes, if 
they each believed that the bomb failed to neutralize the bunker, 
whether it was reasonable for them to let the fire carry out that 
objective.  Again, a court needs to approach this question from 
the separate position of these two individuals.  From Sambor's 
point of view, he had a confirmation from an experienced fire 
fighter that the fire could be controlled.  He knew that many 
fire fighters were at hand and ready to "start the squirts."  It 
seems clear that a reasonable police official in Sambor's 
  
position could have believed that a controlled fire was a 
reasonable means to destroy a bunker which still posed a threat. 
 Richmond's point of view, although he also knew that he 
had plenty of fire fighters ready to put out the fire at his 
command, is more problematic.25  It is undisputed that 
photographs showing cans marked "gasoline" on the roof were 
passed around in a prior meeting of officials at which Richmond 
was present.  However, there is no evidence that any official 
from either the police department or fire department knew that 
there was gasoline on the rooftop prior to the disaster on May 
13, 1985.  Furthermore, Richmond knew on May 13, 1985, that cans 
marked "gasoline" on another MOVE house in Chester, Pennsylvania, 
actually contained water.  Richmond admits, however, that it 
would have been unreasonable to let the fire burn if he knew 
there was gasoline on the roof.  Given the information possessed 
by Richmond at the time, including the fact that he was there not 
to fight any fires that he may see, as would be his normal 
duties, but to lend support to the police effort, we cannot say 
that this "split-second judgment -- in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving --" was not objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. 
  I look at Brooks' situation based on plaintiffs' 
version of the facts and assume arguendo that he believed the 
                     
25
.  The evidence shows, and the district court found, that 
Richmond played no part in the decision to drop the explosive on 
the bunker. 
  
bunker to have been effectively neutralized by the explosive and 
that he concurred, at least for a time, in the decision to let 
the fire burn the bunker.  Nevertheless, I do not believe that 
this decision, even taken in this light, would be unreasonable.  
The objective, it must be remembered, was to destroy the bunker 
which still was standing and could be reoccupied. 
 To summarize, I find that the record does not indicate 
that there was a Fourth Amendment seizure of the MOVE members, a 
conclusion which in itself in my view ends the federal aspects of 
the case.  I further would hold that even if there was a Fourth 
Amendment seizure, the defendants' decisions to destroy the 
bunker by dropping the explosive and allowing the fire to burn 
were not objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  I 
thus conclude that the city defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment on the federal claims. 
 
 D. Apparent Lawfulness of the Conduct 
 I will assume, however, that the defendants did effect 
a Fourth Amendment seizure, and I will assume further that the 
seizure was unreasonable.  I then inquire whether the city 
defendants still are entitled to qualified immunity on the basis 
that they reasonably could have considered their conduct would be 
lawful.  I have no difficulty concluding that they are entitled 
to such immunity.  Judge Scirica comes to the same conclusion and 
thus he joins in this section "D. Apparent Lawfulness of the 
Conduct," of the opinion. 
  
 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that 
"government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory 
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."  457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (citations omitted).  
The Court later explained: 
 The contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing 
violates that right.  This is not to say that 
an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question 
has previously been held unlawful, but it is 
to say that in the light of pre-existing law 
the unlawfulness must be apparent. 
 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039 
(citations omitted). 
   Thus, the relevant question here is "the objective 
(albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer 
could have believed" the use of the explosive and of the fire to 
destroy the bunker, based on the information the defendants then 
possessed, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, that is, 
"to be lawful, in light of clearly established law" as of May 13, 
1985.  See id.  
 This court has interpreted the standard of "clearly 
established law" to require "some but not precise factual 
correspondence between relevant precedents and the conduct at 
issue," and that "[a]lthough officials need not predict the 
future course of constitutional law, they are required to relate 
  
established law to analogous factual settings."  Ryan v. 
Burlington County, 860 F.2d 1199, 1208-09 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1745 (1989) (quoting People of 
Three Mile Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 
144 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 The district court relied and the plaintiffs rely on 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, and section 508 
of the Crimes Code as the "clearly established law" which should 
have been related by the defendants to the factual setting facing 
them.  The defendants argue correctly that violation of state law 
is in itself not determinative in this section 1983 action.  See 
Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d at 1113.  Yet I do not fault the 
district court for referring to Pennsylvania law, as the court 
cited that law to show that its violation could be considered in 
determining the scope of the clearly established constitutional 
right of an arrestee.  Thus, the state law could help define the 
scope of federal law.  And, indeed, the Supreme Court did cite 
section 508 in developing its constitutional standard. 
 But the defendants argue quite persuasively that the 
district court erred in relying on Tennessee v. Garner.  In that 
case, decided less than two months prior to May 13, 1985, a 
police officer shot and killed an unarmed teenage burglary 
suspect to prevent his escape.  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 
3-4, 105 S.Ct. 1697.  The Court held that "[t]he use of deadly 
force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the 
circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable."  Id. at 11, 105 
S.Ct. at 1701.  However, "[w]here the officer has probable cause 
  
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical 
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not 
constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly 
force."  Id.  The Court concluded that "if the suspect threatens 
the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe 
that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or 
threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may 
be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, 
some warning has been given."  Id. at 11-12, 105 S.Ct. at 1701. 
 I agree with the defendants that Tennessee v. Garner is 
far from an analogous case.  We are concerned here with the use 
of the explosive and the burning of the bunker to provide a safe 
means to inject tear gas into a house to arrest the armed and 
dangerous occupants barricaded inside.  There is only a very 
broad and vague similarity between Tennessee v. Garner and this 
case: there was use of great force in both in some aspect of the 
process of effectuating an arrest.  As can be expected, extensive 
research has revealed no case that justly can be deemed 
analogous. 
 This court's cases do not support use of such an 
attenuated connection as the district court seemed to have done 
here with its use of Tennessee v. Garner.  For example, in Ryan 
v. Burlington County, 860 F.2d at 1208-09, this court extended 
the clearly established law regarding rights of inmates to deny 
qualified immunity to defendants even though prior case did not 
involve officials in the precise positions held by the 
defendants.  And in Good v. Dauphin County Social Serv., 891 F.2d 
  
at 1094-95, this court applied clearly established case law 
regarding warrantless searches to a case where the novelty was 
that the search was to prevent child abuse.  In Sourbeer v. 
Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1103-04 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
483 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 3276 (1987), this court affirmed the 
district court's reliance on clearly established law regarding 
the due process rights of sentenced inmates to hold that 
defendants were on notice as to similar rights of an unsentenced 
inmate.  In Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 733 (3d Cir. 1987), 
this court applied the clearly established law that prohibited 
dismissal of public employees in retaliation for political speech 
or association to a case where the employee was demoted.  
Similarly, in Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1024-25 
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1049 (1993), this court 
applied that same law to the dismissal of deputy sheriffs in 
particular. 
 At the defendants' behest, both the district court and 
the magistrate judge examined Ginter v. Stallcup, 641 F. Supp. 
939 (E.D. Ark. 1986), as a possible factual precedent.  That case 
involved an effort by local police officers and FBI agents to 
capture a fugitive charged with murder who was hiding in a 
residence and apparently was firing at the officers with 
automatic weapons.  The officers introduced tear gas and diesel 
fuel into a vent on the roof of the house and set fire to it.  
The district court concluded that there was no "clearly 
established law" prior to the event that would hold that "the use 
of fire to 'burn out' a fugitive would violate the constitutional 
  
rights of the fugitive."  Id. at 953.  On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the grant of qualified 
immunity to the two defendant officers with respect to the claim 
of unnecessary destruction of property, on the basis that unless 
the officers knew of the fugitive's death before the fire, they 
had not been shown to have acted unreasonably in setting the 
fire.  Ginter v. Stallcup, 869 F.2d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 But Ginter v. Stallcup, as the district court in this 
case pointed out, was decided in 1986, though it involved an 
event that took place in June 1983, which was before the MOVE 
episode.  In these circumstances, Ginter v. Stallcup could not 
possibly be used to demonstrate clearly established law as of May 
13, 1985.  Furthermore, as the magistrate judge noted, Ginter v. 
Stallcup involved "a handful of police officers [who] had to take 
immediate action against an armed murderer" as opposed to the 
situation here, where "the police presence . . . was on a massive 
and well-equipped scale."  Id. at 360.  While Ginter v. Stallcup 
is easily distinguishable, the fact that it is as factually close 
a case as anyone can find offers some insight for our inquiry as 
to whether the alleged unlawfulness here was "apparent."     
 Nevertheless, I recognize that in certain instances the 
alleged act is so obviously wrongful that all reasonable 
officials would consider it unlawful, regardless of whether the 
act itself was addressed by case law.  For example, in Stoneking 
v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), public 
schools officials were sued for allegedly condoning two teachers' 
acts of sexual misconduct against students.  This court did not 
  
require that there be an analogous case in which sexual abuse of 
a student or the allowing of such abuse was held to have violated 
the student's constitutional rights.  Rather, it "seem[ed] 
ludicrous to be obliged to consider whether it was 'clearly 
established' that it was impermissible for school teachers and 
staff to sexually molest students."  Id. at 726-27.  In other 
words, the alleged act of condoning sexual misconduct by teachers 
against students so clearly violated the student's constitutional 
rights that the unlawfulness of this act was apparent, even in 
the absence of an analogous case.  The Stoneking approach 
sensibly precludes an official from obtaining summary judgment if 
he acts in a way that no other official has acted because other 
officials recognize the acts to be clearly unlawful.  Of course, 
that approach has no place in this case. 
 Overall, it is clear that even if somehow a court found 
that there was an unreasonable seizure in this case, it could not 
possibly say, in the words of Anderson v. Creighton, "that in the 
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness" of either dropping 
the explosive or letting the fire burn should have been apparent.  
483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039.  The 1985 MOVE confrontation 
was unprecedented in the case law.  The exceptional circumstances 
here constitute precisely the kind of situation that requires the 
firm and swift official action which must be shielded by 
qualified immunity.  I conclude that there was no clearly 
established law as of May 13, 1985, which would have required the 
officials to choose an alternative approach to execute the 
warrants.  Thus, as Judge Scirica joins in this section of the 
  
opinion the city defendants, meaning the individual defendants, 
are entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims. 
 
 V. LIABILITY OF THE CITY 
 The district court concluded that Brooks' concurrence 
in the decision to let the bunker burn means that the city is 
suable under section 1983.  Alternatively, even if Brooks did not 
concur, the district court found that decisions made by Sambor or 
Richmond were sufficient so that the city could be held liable.  
Because I would hold that the city defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment on the federal claims on the grounds that their 
actions did not amount to constitutional violations, as there was 
no seizure at all, I would hold that the city also is entitled to 
summary judgment on the federal claims.  Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036 
(1978) (municipalities cannot be held liable under section 1983 
"unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some 
nature caused a constitutional tort"); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 
U.S. 159, 171, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3108 (1985) (plaintiffs who did 
not prevail in official-capacity action was not "entitled to look 
for relief, both on the merits and for fees, to the governmental 
entity").  While this court indicated in Fagan v. City of 
Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1291-94 (3d Cir. 1994), that in some 
circumstances a city may be liable even though its officers are 
not liable, I see no basis here to impose independent liability 
on the city.  See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 
799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573 (1986).  Judges Scirica and Lewis 
  
disagree with this conclusion for the reasons they express and 
thus we will affirm the order denying the city summary judgment. 
 
 VI. GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF GOODE, 
            POWELL, AND KLEIN AS TO THE STATE LAW CLAIMS 
 In light of the conclusions Judge Scirica and I have 
reached with respect to qualified immunity and in light of the 
reasons Judge Scirica is setting forth separately, we will affirm 
the judgments in favor of Goode, Powell, and Klein on the state 
law claims.  The magistrate judge explained, and the district 
court summarily agreed, that as employees of the city, officials 
are entitled to statutory immunity unless "it is judicially 
determined that the act of the employee caused the injury and 
that such act constituted a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or 
willful misconduct."  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8550 (1982).  I 
agree as well.  Thus, in my view the finding that the dropping of 
the explosive was lawful establishes that Goode, Powell, and 
Klein did not lose their immunity under this section.   
 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
 I cannot conclude our opinion without an overview of 
the matter.  In retrospect, there can be no doubt that the 
defendants' actions had tragic consequences.  Yet there is not 
the slightest doubt that it was MOVE and not the defendants who 
put the forces in motion which created the tragedy for the MOVE 
members placed the defendants in an impossible situation.  
  
Because of their obvious contempt for the orderly implementation 
of the judicial process, they forced the defendants to undertake 
a military-type operation.  In a country operating under an 
organized legal system the response of a person confronted with 
an arrest warrant must be to surrender.  Unfortunately the 
occupants of the MOVE house did not recognize this obvious truth.  
Finally, I point out that the courts must recognize that in 
certain instances the civil authorities are required to take 
strong steps to enforce the law and maintain public order.  The 
Constitution does not preclude these steps. 
 In view of the conclusions I have set forth and in my 
view of the conclusions set forth by Judge Scirica and Judge 
Lewis, the orders for summary judgment with respect to all claims 
in favor of defendants Goode, Powell, and Klein will be affirmed.  
The orders denying summary judgment with respect to all federal 
claims in favor of Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond, will be reversed 
and on remand the district court should enter summary judgment in 
their favor on those claims.  The order denying the city summary 
judgment will be affirmed but on the further proceedings on 
remand the district court shall consider the claims against the 
city in accordance with the reasonableness standard Judge Scirica 
and I have adopted.  We note that the district court granted the 
city partial summary judgment with respect to the dropping of the 
bomb and that no appeal from that order is pending.  
Nevertheless, the rationale adopted by Judge Scirica and Judge 
Lewis leads to the conclusion that the city was not entitled to 
summary judgment on that point.  Thus, while we do not disturb 
  
that unappealed summary judgment, we observe that the plaintiffs 
might want to seek relief from it in the district court under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).  The appeals 
by Brooks, Sambor, and Richmond from the denial of summary 
judgment on immunity grounds on the state law claims will be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as will James' appeal from the 
order of the district court granting the city summary judgment on 
her uncompensated property damage claim.  We will remand the 
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and 
for disposition of the remaining claims.  The parties will bear 
their own costs on this appeal. 
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 I agree with Judge Greenberg that all individual 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.  Although I agree 
that the proper analysis on the use of excessive force in 
effecting an arrest is found in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 
395 (1989), rather than in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 
(1984),26 I do not believe that as a matter of law no reasonable 
jury could conclude that the decision to employ the incendiary 
device was an excessive use of force.27  Accordingly, with Judge 
                     
26
.  In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1988), the Court 
held, "[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used 
excessive force--deadly or not--in the course of an arrest, 
investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should 
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' 
standard . . . ."  Applying this standard to determine "whether 
the force used to effect a particular seizure is `reasonable' 
under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of `the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental 
interests at stake."  Id. at 396 (citation omitted).   
     I believe Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) is 
limited by its facts.  Garner assessed the reasonableness of 
force used in a particular factual setting but did not provide 
the definitive reasonableness test for all seizures involving the 
use of deadly force.  Although I believe the police may have used 
deadly force against the MOVE members, that confrontation is 
readily distinguishable from the situation in Garner.   
27
.  The district court analyzed the decision to drop the 
incendiary device separately from the decision to let the bunker 
burn.  Unlike the district court, I see little distinction 
between dropping the incendiary device and letting the fire burn.  
Both actions were undertaken to effect the same result -- to 
enable the police to insert tear gas into the house in order to 
force the occupants out.  The risk of fire existed from the 
moment the device was dropped, and very little time elapsed 
between dropping the device and deciding whether to respond to 
the fire. 
  
Lewis, I hold that the federal claims asserting an 
unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
against the City of Philadelphia survive summary judgment and may 
proceed to trial. 
 Furthermore, I would hold that we may consider an 
interlocutory appeal of the denial of state immunity when the 
state immunity question is bound up with federal qualified 
immunity and that the individual defendants are entitled to 
summary judgment on the state claims because the officials' 
conduct did not rise to the level of willful misconduct.   
 I. 
 I believe there was a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Osage Avenue house was occupied by the subjects 
of the arrest warrant and the officials used force with the aim 
of gaining entry into the house or forcing the occupants out.  
The incendiary device was "the very instrumentality set in motion 
or put in place in order to achieve that result."  Brower v. 
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989).  In Brower, the Court 
noted that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur when the 
effect of seizure is purely fortuitous.28  But the Court 
                     
28
.  To illustrate the point, the Court laid out two scenarios:  
(1) where a parked and unoccupied police car slips its brake and 
pins an innocent passerby against a wall; and (2) where the 
accidentally pinned passerby happens to be a serial murderer for 
whom there is an outstanding arrest warrant.  The Court said 
there could be no seizure in either case because there was no 
"governmental termination of freedom of movement through means 
intentionally applied."  Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
597 (1989).  The intent referred to in the phrase, "through means 
  
cautioned that we cannot say there was not a seizure when an 
individual is "stopped by the accidental discharge of a gun with 
which he was meant only to be bludgeoned, or by a bullet in the 
heart that was meant only for the leg."  Id. at 598-99.  Thus, 
our inquiry is not whether the officials intended all the 
consequences of their use of the incendiary device, but whether 
they intended to use force to arrest these individuals.  I 
conclude that they did, and because the MOVE members were harmed 
by the fire caused by the incendiary device, "the very 
instrumentality set in motion or put in place in order to" arrest 
the occupants of the house, I find a Fourth Amendment seizure.  
Id. at 599.     
 II. 
 I do not believe that we can say, as a matter of law, 
that no reasonable jury could conclude that the decision to use 
the incendiary device was an excessive use of force.  Both the 
reasonableness of the decision to end the confrontation before 
nightfall rather than allow the stand-off to continue and the 
reasonableness of the choice of means to end the stand-off -- 
eliminating the bunker with an incendiary device -- are questions 
of fact.29  Also, the reasonableness of the officials' views of 
(..continued) 
intentionally applied," does not go to the intent of seizure.  It 
is irrelevant that the serial murderer's arrest was otherwise 
intended.  What matters is whether the means -- e.g., the car -- 
was intentionally applied to this individual.   
29
.  The degree of risk posed by the use of the incendiary device 
is disputed.  But questions about the contents of the incendiary 
  
the threat of the bunker after the incendiary device was dropped 
and the reasonableness of their decision to let the fire burn the 
bunker are questions of fact.  Accordingly, I find summary 
judgment is inappropriate on the question of whether the 
plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an 
unreasonably excessive use of force.  Of course, as stated, I 
believe all individual defendants are entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
 III. 
 Because I cannot say, as a matter of law, that there 
has been no Fourth Amendment violation, Monell v. Department of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), does not relieve the 
city of liability.  Under City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 
U.S. 112, 127 (1988), and Pembauer v. City of Cincinnati, 475 
U.S. 469, 481 (1986), we must consider whether the acts of the 
municipal officers may be attributed to the city.  I believe that 
their actions meet the standards outlined in those cases, and I 
hold the city responsible for the acts of these officials.  
Furthermore, under Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 
650 (1980), the city does not have qualified immunity from 
liability even if it can show that the officials themselves are 
entitled to immunity from personal liability under § 1983. 
(..continued) 
device and the awareness of the officials that gasoline or other 
explosives may have been in the vicinity of the bunker are 




 Under the facts here, I believe we may consider an 
appeal of the district court's denial of a claim of state 
immunity.  In Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1109 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991), we concluded that a 
denial of a claim of qualified immunity premised upon New Jersey 
state law was not appealable.  But in Brown we conducted a three-
step inquiry:  First we looked to the statute, then we looked to 
interpretations of that statute by the state's courts, and 
finally we looked to see whether the state disfavored 
interlocutory appeals.  In Brown, after reviewing the statute and 
case law, we believed the appealability issue could go either 
way.  But because New Jersey had a policy strongly disfavoring 
interlocutory appeals, we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  
Applying the same analysis here, I would reach the opposite 
conclusion.  
 I agree that the language of Pennsylvania's Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act does not contemplate immunity from 
suit but only immunity from liability.  But that is not 
necessarily dispositive.  My reading of Brown is that when there 
are issues of federal immunity along with issues of state 
immunity, we are required to take a closer look at a state's 
approach to immunity.  In Pennsylvania, that closer look embraces 
Lancie v. Giles, 572 A.2d 827, 829 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).  
Lancie noted that the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on 
  
the appealability of summary judgments denying federal qualified 
immunity makes the issue of appealability of denials of state 
statutory immunity more difficult when cases also involve issues 
of federal immunity.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
addressed this question, but in the absence of guidance from the 
state supreme court, we should look to decisions from the lower 
state courts.  See Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 
271, 273-74 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Although lower state court decisions 
are not controlling on an issue on which the highest court of the 
state has not spoken, federal courts must attribute significant 
weight to these decisions in the absence of any indication that 
the highest state court would rule otherwise.").  I believe this 
signal from Lancie is strong enough to tip the balance in favor 
of hearing the interlocutory appeal of the denial of summary 
judgment on the state law immunity claims. 
 I also would grant summary judgment on the state 
immunity question because, as a matter of law, the individual 
defendants' conduct did not rise to the level of willful 
misconduct.30  Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims 
Act denies immunity to an employee of a local agency when the 
                     
30
.  The district court granted summary judgment to the city on 
the state law claims because it found that the city had not 
properly made itself suable beyond the categories of cases 
contemplated by the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort 
Claims Act.  The statute sets out a list of eight acts that may 
result in the imposition of liability on a local agency.  
Effecting arrest of individuals is not one of the enumerated 
actions.  
  
employee's action constituted "a crime, actual fraud, actual 
malice or willful misconduct."  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550 (1990).  
Pennsylvania courts have defined "willful misconduct" to mean 
"conduct whereby the actor desired to bring about the result that 
followed or at least was aware that it was substantially certain 
to follow, so that such desire can be implied."  King v. Breach, 
540 A.2d 976, 981 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (citing Evans v. 
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 212 A.2d 440 (Pa. 1965)). 
 Recently, in Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 
294 (Pa. 1994), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the City 
of Pittsburgh's exclusive reliance on a jury finding in a federal 
action that an officer was liable for using excessive force to 
establish willful misconduct.  This indicates that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court requires a higher standard than 
excessive force for finding willful misconduct sufficient to 
defeat immunity under the Tort Claims Act.  Furthermore, I 
believe the statement in Lancie about the difficulty created by 
differing state and federal standards on immunity signals that 
Pennsylvania will defer to the federal standard and deny immunity 
only where the actor had reason to know that his actions violated 
clearly established rights. 
 V. 
 Except as otherwise noted, I join Judge Greenberg's 
holdings, even though I do not agree with every detail of his 
opinion.   
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LEWIS, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 I join in Parts II and III of Judge Greenberg's opinion 
and in Part I (Factual Background) insofar as it recounts the 
undisputed facts as revealed and supported by the record.  For 
the reasons I discuss below, however, I do not join in Parts IV 
through VII of Judge Greenberg's opinion. 
 I. 
 I begin by setting forth my agreement with Judge 
Scirica that no distinction should be drawn between the decision 
to drop the incendiary device and the decision to let the fire 
burn.  As Judge Scirica observes, both actions were undertaken to 
effect the same result, namely, to enable the police to insert 
tear gas into the house in order to force the MOVE occupants out.  
I also agree with Judge Scirica, for the reasons stated in his 
concurring and dissenting opinion, that the police effected a 
Fourth Amendment seizure in this case. 
 Finally, I join Judge Scirica in holding that the 
federal claims asserting an unconstitutional seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment against the City of Philadelphia survive 
summary judgment and may proceed to trial.  However, I do not 
agree with either Judge Scirica or Judge Greenberg that Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), provides the proper analytic 
  
framework for assessing the constitutionality of the use of force 
in this case.  Instead, it is plain to me that Tennessee v. 
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), provides the proper test. 
 II. 
 THE MAJORITY'S ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION 
 AS TO THE APPLICABLE STANDARD 
 
 Judge Greenberg concludes that the city defendants' use 
of the incendiary device and ensuing fire to effect the seizure 
of the MOVE occupants did not constitute deadly force.  While 
Judge Scirica acknowledges that deadly force may have been used 
against the MOVE members, he believes that Garner is limited by 
its facts and distinguishable from the confrontation here.  See 
Judge Scirica's concurring and dissenting opinion Typescript at 1 
n.1.  Thus, the majority concludes that the district court erred 
in applying Garner, a case involving the use of deadly force, to 
assess the constitutionality of the use of force against MOVE.  
Instead, the majority holds that the district court should have 
applied the reasonableness test described in Graham, a case 
involving the use of non-deadly force, to test the 
constitutionality of the use of force in this case.  In so 
holding, I believe Judge Greenberg misapprehends the nature of 
the force contained in the incendiary device and the ensuing 




 The force embodied in the incendiary device and in the 
fire was, by any sensible standard, "deadly" force.  It should 
not escape our attention that the destructive device in question 
was a bomb capable of blasting a hole in the roof of a city 
building.  This lethal device could and did accomplish a degree 
of destruction well beyond that which even bullets fired from a 
high-powered weapon could achieve.  To me, this constitutes 
deadly force, for I cannot imagine how anyone can conclude that a 
device such as this was not capable of taking human life -- 
which, in fact, it ultimately did.  Contrary to the conclusion 
drawn by the majority, I believe the city defendants, who were 
professional law enforcement and fire-fighting personnel, had 
every reason to know that their actions created a substantial 
risk of death or serious bodily injury to the MOVE members 
residing at 6221 Osage Avenue.  See Model Penal Code § 3.11(2) 
(defining "deadly force" as "force which the actor uses with the 
purpose of causing or which he [or she] knows to create a 
substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily harm") 
(emphasis supplied). 
 Moreover, I would conclude that the dropping of the 
explosive device would have constituted the use of deadly force 
even had no fire ensued as a result of this act.  The intention 
of the defendant officials in dropping the explosive device was 
to blast the bunker from atop the roof.  This intention must be 
considered in light of the fact that the defendant officials had 
  
no way of knowing whether the bunker was occupied at the time the 
explosive device was deployed.  The only viable conclusion, given 
the bomb's purpose and the reasonable (and unexplored) 
possibility that the bunker was occupied at the time the bomb was 
dropped, is that in dropping the explosive device, the defendant 
officials knew that they were creating a substantial risk of 
causing death or serious bodily harm.  Had the defendant 
officials' objective to blast the bunker from the roof been 
fulfilled, and had the bunker been occupied at the moment of 
impact, the bunker's occupant or occupants would have been 
forcibly thrown from the roof of 6221 Osage to the street below.  
The substantiality of the risk of death or serious bodily injury 
from such a fall is self-evident and beyond debate. 
 In light of reason, experience and the applicable 
standard, I could not disagree more strenuously with Judge 
Greenberg's conclusion that in dropping the explosive device onto 
the roof of an occupied building and in letting a fire spread 
upon that occupied building's roof, the city defendants did not 
use deadly force.  In addition, and putting aside the fact that a 
fire ensued, I cannot accept Judge Greenberg's conclusion that in 
dropping the device to blast the bunker off of the roof, city 
officials did not know they were creating a substantial risk of 
death or serious bodily harm. 
 B. 
  
 The majority concludes that Garner is inapplicable and 
that "the appropriate inquiry is the reasonableness of the city 
defendants' acts."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 52.  I am perplexed by 
this conclusion, for in reaching its holding regarding the 
constitutionality of deadly force used in the course of an 
arrest, the Supreme Court in Garner applied and relied upon the 
reasonableness test embodied in the Fourth Amendment.  See 
Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-12 ("there can be no question that 
apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment"). 
 The majority implies that Garner and Graham are 
incompatible cases.  In fact, Garner and Graham are complementary 
cases.  As the district court noted, the Supreme Court in Garner 
for the first time analyzed within the reasonableness framework 
of the Fourth Amendment an excessive force claim arising in the 
context of an arrest.  See Africa v. City of Philadelphia, 809 
F. Supp. 375, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (explaining that prior to 
Garner, excessive force claims were analyzed under the "shocks 
the conscience" standard).  In doing so, the Court squarely 
addressed the very issue we confront here, namely, the 
constitutionality of the use of deadly force by law enforcement 
officials in the course of an arrest.  In Graham, the Court 
merely "ma[de] explicit what was implicit in Garner's analysis," 
by holding that "all claims that law enforcement officers have 
used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the course of an 
  
arrest . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and 
its `reasonableness' standard . . . ."  Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 
(emphasis in original).  The Court then proceeded to apply the 
reasonableness test to the use of non-deadly force, as it had 
already done with regard to the use of deadly force in Garner. 
 Taken together, then, Garner and Graham establish the 
following set of complementary principles:  (1) the 
reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment is to be used when 
assessing the constitutionality of police employment of force in 
the context of an arrest; (2) when the force employed constitutes 
"deadly force," the constitutionality of its use is to be 
determined according to the reasonableness test set forth in 
Garner, and such force is deemed unreasonable unless it is 
"necessary to prevent the [suspect's] escape and the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant 
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or 
others[,]" Garner, 471 U.S. at 3; and (3) when the force employed 
is non-deadly, the constitutionality of its use is to be assessed 
according to the factors enumerated in Graham.  Thus, while 
Garner and Graham do establish a complementary set of principles, 
Garner is appropriately applied to situations, such as this one, 
involving the use of deadly force, whereas Graham speaks to and 
controls situations involving the use of non-deadly force.  They 
share a focus upon the use of excessive force, but it is the 
  
nature and degree of that excessive force which dictates their 
respective applications. 
 Accordingly, while I agree with Judge Scirica that as a 
matter of law, a reasonable jury could, under Graham, conclude 
that the decision to employ the incendiary device was an 
excessive use of force, because I believe that this case involves 
the use of deadly force, and in light of my understanding of the 
relationship between Garner and Graham, I think the proper test 
for determining the constitutionality of the use of force in this 
case is found in Garner, and not in Graham.31 
 Our disagreement as to applicable test is not without 
considerable significance.  As should be clear, if Graham is the 
appropriate standard by which to determine the constitutionality 
of the use of force here, then general reasonableness factors 
would guide a jury's determination as to whether excessive force 
was used.  By stark contrast, Garner would not invite a jury to 
be guided by the more flexible general reasonableness standard.  
Garner imposes a stricter standard governing police conduct and 
the use of excessive force -- and with good reason, since the 
intrusiveness of deadly force is qualitatively distinct from all 
other forms of excessive force.  Accordingly, Garner defines and 
                     
31
. I agree with Judge Scirica that under Graham, a jury 
question exists as to whether excessive force was used in this 
case.  However, as I have stated, I do not believe that Graham 
controls this case.  I believe that Garner controls, and under 
Garner, it is clear to me that the deadly force used here was 
excessive as a matter of law and, therefore, unlawful. 
  
explains the reasonableness of the excessive force to which it is 
addressed -- deadly force -- in narrower terms.  In other words, 
while the reasonableness inquiry is a common component with 
regard to both standards, that inquiry is, and should be, more 
precise and exacting when deadly force has been used.  Thus, if 
Garner were applied, a jury would be asked more pointedly to 
determine whether the deadly force employed was reasonable 
because it was necessary to prevent the escape of suspects 
believed to pose a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the police or others.  It is this test, and 
not the more lenient Graham standard, by which the propriety of 
the law enforcement officers' decisions in this case should be 
gauged.  And, as I have already indicated, I believe that under 
Garner only one reasonable conclusion can be reached here:  the 
city defendants used excessive force. 
 III. 
 THE MAJORITY'S ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION 
 AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
 
 The majority states that it has no difficulty 
concluding that the individual defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity because they reasonably could have considered 
their conduct to be lawful.  Maj. Op. Typescript at 66.  I 
disagree.  I would hold that the individual defendants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  Further, I believe that the 
source of the majority's error here flows directly from its 
  
misunderstanding and misapplication of our construction of the 
term "clearly established law," in the wake of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1981), 
which first articulated that standard. 
 As the majority correctly observes, the relevant 
question here is whether a reasonable officer, possessing the 
same information as did the defendants, could have believed that 
the use of the incendiary device and fire to destroy the bunker 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, that is, "lawful, in 
light of clearly established law" as of May 13, 1985.  See 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  Accordingly, 
our task is to determine what the "clearly established law" 
governing the defendants' actions was on that date.  The majority 
argues that there was no clearly-established law on the date in 
question which would have required the officials to choose an 
alternative approach to executing the warrants.  Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 73.  In failing to grasp the breadth of the 
"clearly established law" standard, and in thus failing, once 
again, to recognize the applicability of Tennessee v. Garner to 
the events in question, the majority has erred. 
 As I have already noted, in Garner, which admittedly 
was decided a mere 48 days prior to the events in question,32 the 
                     
32
. While the majority's analysis does not depend upon or even 
address this point, I do not believe the close temporal proximity 
between the decision in Garner and the events in question to be 
relevant or controlling.  In a recent opinion, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed that while the circuits 
  
Supreme Court held that where an arresting officer has probable 
cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of death or 
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is 
(..continued) 
"have struggled to decide how long after a decision state 
officials have to become familiar with `the law,' . . . no rule 
has emerged."  Lintz v. Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 
1994).  That court went on to hold that a "rule of reason" should 
apply in each case with respect to official compliance with new 
decisions.  Id.  I believe it to be not only reasonable, but 
legally correct, that once the Supreme Court has announced a 
decision which governs the behavior of government or society, 
unless the Court states otherwise, it's holding becomes the law 
of the land when the judgment is entered and is binding upon 
those affected by it.  We have, in effect, acknowledged this in 
Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087, 1092 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (stating that the ultimate issue in the "clearly 
established law" inquiry is whether, despite the absence of a 
case applying established principles to the same facts, 
"reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant 
time could have believed, in light of what was in the decided 
case law, that their conduct would be lawful") (emphasis 
supplied).  Moreover, and perhaps more important, as the district 
court noted, the decision in Tennessee v. Garner in significant 
respects mirrored, and in fact relied in part upon, section 508 
of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code with respect to a peace 
officer's use of force in making an arrest.  See In re City of 
Philadelphia Litigation, 849 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  
Thus, Garner hardly represented a novel twist in the law 
governing the defendants' actions:  that law was already on the 
books.  In fact, it would appear that section 508 squarely 
covered the actions taken by the defendants here.  See 18 Pa.C.S. 
§ 508 (providing that a peace officer is justified in using 
deadly force "only when he [or she] believes that such force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or 
. . . other[s] . . . or when he [or she] believes both that:  
(1) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being 
defeated by resistance or escape; and (2) the person to be 
arrested has committed or attempted to commit a forcible felony 
or is attempting to escape and possesses a deadly weapon, or 
otherwise indicates that he [or she] will endanger human life or 
inflict serious bodily injury unless arrested without delay"). 
  
not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using 
deadly force.  Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
 Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to 
believe that he [or she] has committed a 
crime involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious physical harm, deadly 
force may be used if necessary to prevent 
escape, and if, where feasible, some warning 
has been given. 
Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12. 
 In concluding that Garner bears an insufficient factual 
correspondence to be deemed the "clearly established law" 
applicable to this case, the majority runs counter to our 
traditional broad application of Harlow v. Fitzgerald's "clearly 
established law" standard.  See, e.g., People of Three Mile 
Island v. Nuclear Reg. Com'rs, 747 F.2d 139, 144-45 (3d Cir. 
1984); Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, 882 F.2d 720, 
726 (3d Cir. 1989).  Although we have recognized that we cannot 
expect executive officials to anticipate the evolution of 
constitutional law, we do demand that they apply general, 
well-developed legal principles in analogous factual settings, 
i.e., in settings bearing some, but not necessarily precise, 
factual correlation to the applicable precedent.  See People of 
Three Mile Island, 747 F.2d at 144. 
 Yet the situation we face here is identical to the 
situation the Supreme Court confronted in Garner:  a case of 
police use of deadly force in carrying out a seizure of a person 
  
or persons actively resisting arrest.  Even in their particulars, 
Garner and our case are compellingly analogous.  Obviously, this 
case involves the use of deadly force against a group of armed 
and dangerous adults barricaded inside a house, while Garner 
involved the use of deadly force against an unarmed teenager who 
was running from the police.  However, it bears emphasizing that 
in our case several hours had elapsed between the cessation of 
gunfire from within the MOVE dwelling and the dropping of the 
incendiary device by the police.  Like Garner, the police simply 
were not facing a "shoot or be shot" (or a "drop bomb or be 
shot") situation at the moment the bomb was dropped.  Indeed, 
this case is easier than Garner.  In Garner, the Court determined 
that seizure by deadly force of a fleeing suspect was not worth 
the costs:  it was better to let the suspect escape.  Garner, 471 
U.S. at 11.  In our case, the suspects were not even fleeing.  At 
the time the destructive device was deployed, the MOVE contingent 
(including several children) was not only barricaded inside a 
house, but was also surrounded and greatly outnumbered by 
well-equipped law enforcement personnel.  Thus, unlike Garner, 
escape here was not even a reasonable or realistic possibility.  
As the Court in Garner recognized, "[i]f subsequent arrest [is] 
assured, no one would argue the use of deadly force was 
justified."  Garner, 471 U.S. at 9 n.8. 
 Based upon these considerations, I would hold that 
reasonable officials in the defendants' position at the relevant 
  
time could not have believed, in light of Garner, that their 
conduct would be lawful. 
 Even where the officials in question should have been 
aware of the "clearly established" governing law, we have 
explained that executive officials are still entitled to 
qualified immunity "if based on the information available to them 
they could have believed their conduct would be consistent" with 
that clearly established law.  See Good, 891 F.2d at 1092.  
However, I believe it would have been readily apparent to any 
reasonable official who possessed the same information as did the 
individual defendants on May 13, 1985, that at the time the 
explosive device was dropped, deadly force was not necessary to 
prevent the escape of the occupants of 6221 Osage Avenue. 
 Support for the counter-argument, so far as I can 
gather, is summed up by the majority in the following factors:  
(1) nightfall would render securing the neighborhood too 
difficult; (2) fatigue was setting in among the police personnel 
who had been on duty since the night before; and (3) certain 
members of the police appear to have believed that tunnels had 
been dug from the basement of the MOVE house.  See Maj. Op. 
Typescript at 13.  With respect to the nightfall factor, the 
entire block, including 6221 Osage Avenue, could have been 
illuminated artificially as are highway projects regularly.  One 
can counter that these lights could then have been shot out by 
MOVE members.  But I think a modicum of police ingenuity could 
  
have seen to it that the lights were placed at angles rendering 
them unsusceptible to gunfire.  With respect to police fatigue, 
this, one presumes, could reasonably have been counteracted by 
the replacement of tired officers with fresh personnel. 
 And finally, with regard to the rumored tunnels, 
support in the record for a reasonable belief in the existence of 
escape tunnels is flimsy at best.  The majority suggests that the 
defendants believed that MOVE members might have eluded capture 
through escape tunnels rumored to have been dug under the 
neighborhood.  I would agree that had the defendants reasonably 
believed that MOVE had constructed escape tunnels underneath the 
neighborhood, the dropping of an explosive device might 
reasonably have been perceived as necessary to prevent the escape 
of the MOVE members under cover of the coming night.  However, 
the record as I read it does not support the view that the 
defendants actually believed that MOVE had constructed escape 
tunnels under the neighborhood; at most, it merely suggests a 
belief, based upon a statement that fifteen bushels of dirt had 
been deposited by MOVE members on a curb for disposal, that the 
MOVE members might have dug a tunnel to a neighboring house.  
First of all, digging an escape tunnel to a neighboring house is 
different from digging an escape tunnel "under the neighborhood" 
to some unknown outlet.  But more importantly, even if the record 
supported the existence of such a belief, I would have no 
difficulty in concluding that it was unreasonable, indeed, 
  
far-fetched, in light of the evidence before us.  It is fantasy 
to believe that fifteen bushels of dirt, even to a neighboring 
house, an escape tunnel makes. 
 Thus, I would hold that the individual defendants are 
not entitled to qualified immunity even when the factual 
information available to them on May 13, 1985, is taken into 
consideration. 
 IV. 
 Since I would hold that none of the individual 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in relation to the 
section 1983 claims against them, I would reverse the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Goode, Powell and Klein as to the 
state law claims against these defendants. 
 V. 
 Judge Greenberg observes that in reaching my conclusion 
that the individual defendants used excessive force, I offer "no 
explanation of what alternatives were available," and am 
"[a]pparently . . . willing to have mandated an indefinite 
standoff."  See Maj. Op. Typescript at 61 n.23.  This is in part 
true and largely irrelevant.  It is certainly true that I am 
willing to "mandate" that which is reasonable and lawful.  An 
"indefinite standoff," among other options, qualifies.  But it is 
not our primary purpose here to provide alternatives to unlawful 
police action.  Instead, we are to evaluate the lawfulness of 
what did occur on May 13, 1985.  We should only countenance the 
  
lawful resolution of that unfortunate incident.  Thus, the larger 
point here is that Judge Greenberg, and to a lesser extent, Judge 
Scirica and I simply disagree, based upon our understanding of 
the record and the law, as to whether the dropping of the 
incendiary device was lawful. 
 In concluding that the defendant officials in this case 
used excessive force, I do not mean to imply that situations law 
enforcement officers confront daily are not fraught with 
difficulty and do not frequently require split-second decisions 
involving matters of life and death.  To the contrary, law 
enforcement officers are forced to digest a steady diet of some 
of the most impossible choices under some of the most pressing 
circumstances and unforgiving conditions.  We should, of course, 
be concerned for and sensitive to their fundamental mission, 
which is to ensure the protection and preservation of society. 
 But this, too, must be said:  it is hardly debatable in 
a civilized constitutional democracy that in the final analysis, 
the goal of the enforcement of law, and thus, the maintenance of 
public order, is not promoted through the use of deadly force in 
effecting seizures.  As the Supreme Court has observed, the use 
of deadly force, in fact, frustrates the interest in enforcement 
of law through fair and objective judicial determination of guilt 
and punishment.  Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.  It is partly because the 
use of deadly force "is a self-defeating way of apprehending a 
suspect and so setting the criminal justice mechanism in motion" 
  
that the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, so 
narrowly circumscribes its use.  See Garner, 471 U.S. at 10. 
 The majority in Part VII states that "courts must 
recognize that in certain instances the civil authorities are 
required to take strong steps to enforce the law and maintain 
public order[,]" and that "[t]he Constitution does not preclude 
these steps."  Maj. Op. Typescript at 75.  The danger inherent in 
this statement, which the majority appears to adopt as a precept 
of constitutional jurisprudence, lies in its breadth.  I am 
deeply troubled by the necessary implication of the majority's 
statement, which is that the Constitution does not preclude that 
which is perceived as necessary or expedient to enforce the law 
and maintain public order.  I hold a different view.  I believe 
it to be beyond dispute that the Constitution precludes many acts 
which might, even reasonably, be deemed "necessary" for the 
enforcement of law and the maintenance of public order.  In 
determining what it does and does not preclude, we cannot engraft 
upon the Constitution our own predilections as to what that 
document, as a matter of perceived social necessity, ought or 
ought not permit law enforcement officials to do in the name of 
law and order. 
 CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully concur and 
dissent. 
 
